B-52 Nuclear Weapons Incident

This is a collection of resources, news and analysis about the shocking, virtually uncovered or covered up story of a B-52 armed with 5 or 6 nuclear cruise missiles overflying the US on August 30, 2007. The original story broke in the Military Times and was reported by the Associated Press on 9/5/07. The overflight, the cover up, and the unaccounted for sixth weapon are the subject of intense investigation and scrutiny for independent journalists not controlled by the mainstream global corporate propaganda networks. However, the controlled corporate news coverage, such little as there is, is included here for reference.

Air Force report on "Bent Spear" will scapegoat junior personnel and prolong cover-up

The most serious part of the Air Force cover-up is that the incident has apparently been downgraded to a "Bent Spear" incident -- a mistake involving the handling of nuclear weapons -- from an "Empty Quiver" -- an incident involving the seizure of a nuclear weapon, in this case the sixth nuclear weapon flown from North Dakota to Louisiana.

Air Force report on "Bent Spear" will scapegoat junior personnel and prolong cover-up

By Wayne Madsen

October 19, 2007

www.WayneMadsenReports.com

WMR has previously reported on the August 30, 2007, incident in which five or six nuclear weapons were supposedly misplaced on advanced cruise missiles attached to the pylons of a B-52 that flew from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, was actually the result of an Air Force revolt against deploying the weapons to the Middle East for use in a surprise attack on Iran.

A number of knowledgeable sources have told WMR that six nuclear-armed cruise missiles left Minot but only five were accounted for at Barksdale.

Today, the Air Force is expected to announce the punishment of five Air Force officers said to have been responsible for the August 30 incident. In addition, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is expected to be briefed on the results of the Air Force's six-week investigation of the incident.

The use of the term "firing" with respect to the Air Force officers is suspicious and misleading. All military officers receive their commissions from the President of the United States. Being relieved of one's duties does not mean the officers would automatically lose their commissions.

The Bush administration is attempting to convince the media and the general population that the nuclear incident was similar to a stockroom mistake at a Wal-Mart. The story is being spun that the nuclear-armed missiles were mistakenly removed from a storage bunker in Minot, erroneously mounted on the wings of a B-52 bomber, mistakenly identified on the B-52's flight manifest, and flown across the United States for three hours and sat on a runway at Barksdale for several hours without anyone taking notice.

As former Navy weapons expert Robert Stormer wrote in the Fort Worth Star-Telegram earlier this month, **"This is about how six nuclear advanced cruise missiles got out of their bunkers and onto a combat aircraft without notice of the wing commander, squadron commander, munitions maintenance squadron (MMS), the B-52H's crew chief and command pilot and onto another Air Force base tarmac without notice of that air base's chain of command -- for 10 hours."**

WMR's sources, veterans of the Air Force and CIA, have agreed with the assessment that the August 30 incident was no mistake.

The most serious part of the Air Force cover-up is that the incident has apparently been downgraded to a "Bent Spear" incident -- a mistake involving the handling of nuclear weapons -- from an "Empty Quiver" -- an incident involving the seizure of a nuclear weapon, in this case the sixth nuclear weapon flown from North Dakota to Louisiana.

The scapegoating of Air Force officers poses a distinct problem for the Bush administration. People who are scapegoated soon become whistle blowers.

Dick Cheney & Vigilant Shield: Will a Missing Nuke from the B-52 Incident

be used in a Simulated Terrorist Attack?

This raises the disturbing possibility that not only was the B-52 ordered to participate in a covert mission to attack Iran outside the regular chain of military command, but that one of its nuclear weapons was secretly siphoned off for another covert mission. If Dick Cheney did give the order for the nuclear weapons to be loaded on to the B-52, it is highly likely that he is aware of the location and potential use of the missing nuclear missile. A number of serious questions therefore need to be asked about the appropriateness of Cheney being in charge of TOPOFF 4 and Vigilant Shield. This is even more urgent if there is a missing nuclear warhead that was taken from the B-52 for a yet undisclosed mission. Could this mission be related to the TOPOFF and Vigilant Shield exercises?

Dick Cheney & Vigilant Shield: Will a Missing Nuke from the B-52 Incident be used in a Simulated Terrorist Attack?

by Michael Salla, Ph.D.

October 13, 2007

http://www.opednews.com

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From October 15 to 19, 2007, a set of military and civil exercises will be held in Oregon, Arizona and Guam. The exercises, TOPOFF 4 and Vigilant Shield 08, are designed to test official responses to the detonation of radiological dispersal devices on U.S. territory. The exercises will be overseen by Vice President Dick Cheney who will travel specifically to Portland to coordinate all Federal departments and agencies responses to the simulated attacks. This has led to a number of civilian groups expressing alarm that TOPOFF and Vigilant Shield might be used as a cover for False Flag operations that replicate what occurred during the 911 attacks . On September 11, 2001, Dick Cheney was overseeing a series of simulated terrorist attacks involving hijacked airplanes hitting buildings that was called “Vigilant Guardian”. Vigilant Guardian was run simultaneously with NORAD training exercises called Vigilant Warrior and Northern Vigilance that altogether involved as many

as eleven hijacked airplanes. This created much confusion and led to stand down orders for the US Air Force that was unsure if the 911 attacks were part of the simulated exercises or real attacks. This confusion accounted for the long delays between initial reports of hijacked planes being used in ‘terrorist’ attacks, and Air Force intercept missions being launched using the few planes not involved in the Northern Vigilance exercise.

What makes TOPOFF 4 and Vigilant Shield especially concerning is that they follow upon an incident involving five (later revised up to six) nuclear cruise missiles found on a B-52 sitting on a tarmac at Barksdale Air Force Base on August 30. The Air Force has launched an official inquiry and so far has announced to the public that the B-52 incident was nothing more than an unusually high number of errors. A Washington Post article on September 23 summarized the main arguments for this explanation which has effectively put to an end any further investigations by mainstream media sources. In contrast, a number of researchers have argued that the B-52 incident could not have occurred without very senior officials giving orders, and others refusing to comply with such orders. According to Wayne Madsen a number of Air Force personnel refused to allow the nuclear armed B-52 to fly in a covert mission to Iran outside the normal chain of military command. Madsen describes the nature of the internal conflict over the B-52 incident: “Command and control breakdowns involving U.S. nuclear weapons are unprecedented, except for that fact that the U.S. military is now waging an internal war against neo-cons who are embedded in the U.S. government and military chain of command who are intent on using nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive war with Iran.”

Madsen is alluding here to the most plausible explanation for the source of orders leading to the B-52 incident. The orders emanated from the office of the Vice President, and in particular Dick Cheney himself. Cheney’s orders were opposed all the way up the Department of Defense hierarchy including Admiral William Fallon, Commander of Central Command, and Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates. This is supported by a recent report in the Telegraph newspaper that Gates has become the chief opponent to Dick Cheney’s plans to commit the U.S. to another war against Iran and is encouraging military officers to be more candid in their assessments of a new conflict.

What makes the B-52 incident even more disturbing is that six nuclear cruise missiles left Minot Air Force Base, and the initial Military Times report on September 5 reported that five nuclear warheads were discovered at Barksdale Air Force Base. This was subsequently revised by the Military Times to six in an updated story five days later on September 10. How could the Air Force mix up how many nuclear

weapons were initially involved in the incident? The most plausible explanation is that there had been a discrepancy in the number of nuclear weapons that had left Minot and what had been later discovered at Barksdale? The nuclear armed B-52 had been sitting on the tarmac in an unsecured military environment for up to 10 hours before its nuclear payload was discovered. This offered plenty of time for the removal of one of the nuclear weapons. Such an event had to be covered up for national security purposes which is why the Military Times revised its initial report. The possibility of a missing nuclear weapon is augmented by an unprecedented official standown by the Air Force on September 14 where all planes were grounded allegedly to review Standard Operating Procedures. Was the Air Force really conducting an emergency inventory to locate any missing nuclear weapons?

This raises the disturbing possibility that not only was the B-52 ordered to participate in a covert mission to attack Iran outside the regular chain of military command, but that one of its nuclear weapons was secretly siphoned off for another covert mission. If Dick Cheney did give the order for the nuclear weapons to be loaded on to the B-52, it is highly likely that he is aware of the location and potential use of the missing nuclear missile. A number of serious questions therefore need to be asked about the appropriateness of Cheney being in charge of TOPOFF 4 and Vigilant Shield. This is even more urgent if there is a missing nuclear warhead that was taken from the B-52 for a yet undisclosed mission. Could this mission be related to the TOPOFF and Vigilant Shield exercises?

In a Presidential Statement released on May 21, 2001, President Bush gave Vice President Cheney the power to coordinate national efforts in response to terrorist attacks: “I have asked Vice President Cheney to oversee the development of a coordinated national effort so that we may do the very best possible job of protecting our people from catastrophic harm.” An “Office of National Preparedness” was created to implement the “national effort overseen by Vice President Cheney” and would “coordinate all Federal programs dealing with weapons of mass destruction consequence management within the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other federal agencies.” Effectively, this means that during TOPOFF 4 and Vigilant Shield, VP Cheney will be responsible for all efforts to respond to weapons of mass destruction. He will have the power of override any Department of Defense objections to activities concerning “consequence management” of nuclear weapons. If there was a missing nuclear weapon from the B-52 incident, then TOPOFF and Vigilant Shield could provide the cover for its use.

The possible use of the B-52 missing nuclear weapon could trigger the martial law scenario found in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 51 after the declaration of a “Catastrophic Emergency.” NSPD 51 defines a “Catastrophic Emergency” as “any incident, regardless of location, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the U.S. population, infrastructure, environment, economy, or government functions.” Once declaring such an emergency, President Bush or his successors according to Continuity of Government provisions, can take over all governmental functions at local, state and national levels, as well as private sector activities, to ensure the U.S. emerges from the emergency with an "enduring constitutional government."
So far, the Air Force inquiry is classified and information on a possible missing nuclear weapon has not been disclosed. It is unlikely that much information will be disclosed to the public for national security reasons. The only U.S. Congressman calling for an official public inquiry into the B-52 incident is Dennis Kucinich. As long as the role of Dick Cheney in the B-52 incident is not investigated and the missing nuclear weapon is not located, Cheney should be removed from any position of authority in coordinating civil and military responses to any simulated terrorist attack. Such exercises provide him the opportunity and authority to secretly approve the covert use of a nuclear device that can be used to trigger a declaration of a “Catastrophic Emergency.” U.S. National Security is not served by Dick Cheney having a prominent role in leading TOPOFF 4, Vigilant Shield and any future simulated terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction.

Navy veteran questions why six nuclear missiles were flown on combat aircraft to staging area for Middle East

by John Byrne
10/08/2007
Go to Original.



A retired lieutenant commander in the Navy Reserve who served with the Navy's Supervisor of Salvage questioned in a little-noticed editorial Sunday why six active nuclear

armed cruise missiles were being transferred to an active bomber base that "just happens to be the staging area for Middle Eastern operations."
"The United States also does not transport nuclear weapons meant for elimination attached to their launch vehicles under the wings of a combat aircraft," Navy veteran Robert Stormer wrote in the Texas-based Star-Telegram. "The procedure is to separate the warhead from the missile, encase the warhead and transport it by military cargo aircraft to a repository -- not an operational bomber base that just happens to be the staging area for Middle Eastern operations."
Six nuclear W80 nuclear-armed cruise missiles were flown to Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale AFB in Louisiana where they sat for ten hours undetected.
"Press reports initially cited the Air Force mistake of flying nuclear weapons over the United States in violation of Air Force standing orders and international treaties, while completely missing the more important major issues, such as how six nuclear cruise missiles got loose to begin with," writes Stormer.
"Let me be very clear here: We are not talking about paintball cartridges or pellet gun ammo. We are talking nuclear weapons."
Stormer doesn't buy reports that the missiles were simply lost. The title of his piece is "Nuke transportation story has explosive implications."
"There is a strict chain of custody for all such weapons," he said. "Nuclear weapons handling is spelled out in great detail in Air Force regulations, to the credit of that service. Every person who orders the movement of these weapons, handles them, breaks seals or moves any nuclear weapon must sign off for tracking purposes."
"All security forces assigned are authorized "to use deadly force to protect the weapons from any threat. Nor does anyone quickly move a 1-ton cruise missile -- or forget about six of them, as reported by some news outlets, especially cruise missiles loaded with high explosives.
"This is about how six nuclear advanced cruise missiles got out of their bunkers and onto a combat aircraft without notice of the wing commander, squadron commander, munitions maintenance squadron (MMS), the B-52H's crew chief and command pilot and onto another Air Force base tarmac without notice of that air base's chain of command -- for 10 hours."
At the end of his editorial, he poses the following questions.
The questions that must be answered:
1) Why, and for what ostensible purpose, were these nuclear weapons taken to Barksdale?
2) How long was it before the error was discovered?
3) How many mistakes and errors were made, and how many needed to be made, for this to happen?

4) How many and which security protocols were overlooked?
5) How many and which safety procedures were bypassed or ignored?
6) How many other nuclear command and control non-observations of procedure have there been?
7) What is Congress going to do to better oversee U.S. nuclear command and control?
8) How does this incident relate to concern for reliability of control over nuclear weapons and nuclear materials in Russia, Pakistan and elsewhere?
9) Does the Bush administration, as some news reports suggest, have plans to attack Iran with nuclear weapons?
10) If this was an accident, have we degraded our military to a point where we are now making critical mistakes with our nuclear arsenal? If so, how do we correct this?

Nukes Over America: All a Stupid Mistake. Sure It Was

The trouble with this theory, or story line if you will, is that while nobody at Minot, supposedly, noticed what was happening—even though ground crew workers spent eight hours laboring to get the pod with the six nuke-tipped missiles mounted on the plane's wing. This despite the warheads are clearly visible and identifiable by the silver coating they exhibit when viewed through a little window in each nosecone cover, and because there are red coverings on the nuke nosecones—once the plane got to Barksdale, the ground crew there, which had no reason on earth to suspect it was looking at nuclear warheads, spotted them immediately upon going to the plane.

Nukes Over America: All a Stupid Mistake. Sure It Was
By Dave Lindorff
October 20, 2007
http://www.thiscantbehappening.net/?q=node/50
The Air Force's Friday report on the August 29-30 nuclear weapons incident which saw six armed cruise missiles flown across the continental US in launch position on a B-52H bomber leaves all the big questions unanswered, attempting to shuck the whole thing off as an "unacceptable mistake."
To be sure, Air Force Secretary Michael W. Wynne and Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Maj. Gen. Richard Newton, said that after a

six-week investigation, five officers, including Col. Bruce Emig, commander of the Fifth Bomb Group at Minot AFB in North Dakota, where the flight originated, have been relieved of duty, and 65 other Air Force personnel were also removed from their duties, and both Barksdale and Minot were decertified for their strategic nuclear responsibilities. But that's still pretty small beer for an incident so serious it's never happened before in half a century of nuclear weapons handling.

There are, at this point, no court martials being contemplated, and nobody's been discharged from the military.

Put simply, six 150-kiloton warheads were improperly attached to six Advanced Cruise Missiles, all loaded onto a wing launch pod, and then mounted on the wing of a B-52 H Stratofortress at Minot, along with six similar missiles with dummy warheads, which were loaded onto a launch pod on the plane's other wing, an all 12 were improperly and illegally flown across the country to Barksdale AFB in Louisiana.

The Air Force, following its "investigation," is saying the same thing it said before the investigation: it was all a big "mistake"—the result of "widespread disregard for the rules" regarding handling of nuclear weapons.

A few guys at Minot "inexplicably" screwed up and loaded the nukes and then there were a chain of mistakes because no one else treated the nuclear-tipped missiles as if they were armed with nuclear weapons.

The trouble with this theory, or story line if you will, is that while nobody at Minot, supposedly, noticed what was happening—even though ground crew workers spent eight hours laboring to get the pod with the six nuke-tipped missiles mounted on the plane's wing. This despite the warheads are clearly visible and identifiable by the silver coating they exhibit when viewed through a little window in each nosecone cover, and because there are red coverings on the nuke nosecones—once the plane got to Barksdale, the ground crew there, which had no reason on earth to suspect it was looking at nuclear warheads, spotted them immediately upon going to the plane.

They had no reason to expect nukes because for 40 years it has been illegal for the military to carry nuclear weapons on bombers over US territory, and indeed since 1991, it has been illegal to even load nuclear weapons on a plane, period, even for training purposes on the ground.

How can it be that Air Force ground crew people at Barksdale could spot the nukes in a flash while nobody at Minot—not the workers who mounted the warheads on the missiles in the heavily guarded bunker, not the guards who are supposed to guard those weapons with their lives and prevent any unauthorized removal from the bunkers, not the ground crew that loaded them onto the plan, and not the pilot and crew of the bomber, who are supposed to check every missile before they take off—

noticed they were nuclear warheads? (The weapons went unnoticed for 10 hours in Barksdale, but that's only because no groundcrew visited the plane for that long, but when they did go to it, they reportedly spotted the nukes right off the bat.)

The Air Force, at a press conference announcing the results of its investigation, didn't answer this question. It appears they reporters at the session didn't ask it either.

Certainly the AP reporter didn't ask it, because if she had, she would surely have included the Air Force's answer, or it's non-answer, in her story.

Nobody, apparently, asked the Air Force either about six mysterious violent deaths of Air Force personnel from Minot and Barksdale, and from a mysterious Air Force Special Commando Group, all of which occurred in the days and weeks immediately before, during and after the incident. Two of those deaths—of the Special Commando Group officer and of a Minot weapons guard—were reportedly "suicides."

In an article in the current issue of American Conservative magazine, currently on newsstands, I report that incredibly, no federal investigators from the Pentagon or the federal government even bothered to contact the police investigators or medical examiners who investigated those six deaths—an remarkable failure of due diligence, given the seriousness of this incident.

One retired Navy officer who contacted me during my investigation, who worked in electronic warfare, told me it would be simply impossible for those weapons to have been moved out of the storage bunker. He claims to know for a certainty that all nuclear weapons in the US arsenal are equipped with high-tech tags ("like they have at WalMart and Kmart only better") that would instantly trigger alarms when the weapons are moved, unless they were deliberately disarmed.

So what we have is pretty clearly a cover-up here.

A cover-up of what though?

Here we're into speculation.

One thing we need to keep in mind is that Barksdale AFB, on its website, advertises itself proudly as the base that prepares B-52s for duty in the Middle East Theater.

Another thing we need to keep in mind is that Vice President Dick Cheney is trying hard to gin up a war against Iran, against the better judgment of top military leaders and Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

And a third thing to remember is that these particular six warheads, called M80-1 warheads, are able to be adjusted to have a power of anywhere from 150 kilotons down to just 5 kilotons—a so-called "tactical" size.

Perfect for a tactical strike on an Iranian nuclear processing or research site, or for a “false flag” type attack that could be blamed on a fledgling nuclear power…like Iran.
Of course this is all speculation.
What we do know is that for 36 hours, six nuclear warheads went missing. Nobody at the Pentagon in authority knew they were gone or where they were. And when they were discovered, the initial Pentagon response was to cover it all up. The only reason we know about this incident is that three Air Force officers became whistle-blowers and contacted a reporter at Military Times, a private newspaper trusted by and popular with the rank-and-file military.
And what we know is that this couldn’t have been what the Air Force, six weeks and one “investigation” late, is calling a “mistake.”

Procedural Safeguards Preventing "Mistake" for which 70 Airmen are being Disciplined

The following is a list of the procedures involved in handling, transporting and securing nuclear weapons -- all of which would have had to be forgotten, ignored or countermanded for this "mistake" to occur:
"Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs Supplement"
This Interim Change (IC) 2006-2 provides new/additional guidance regarding the definition and intent of the Air Force Tamper Detection Program, further clarifies the intent for MAJCOMs to develop and distribute sealing procedures and updates general information. A bar (|) indicates a revision from the previous edition.
1. Requirements and Procedures.
1.1. Tamper Control Program. The Two-Person Concept is central to nuclear surety tamper control measures in the Air Force. It is designed to make sure that a lone individual cannot perform an incorrect act or unauthorized procedure on a nuclear weapon, nuclear weapon system, or certified critical component.
1.2. Concept Enforcement. Each organization with a mission or function involving nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems, or certified critical components:
1.2.1. Identifies no-lone zones (where at least two authorized persons must be present during any operation or task).

1.2.1. (AFSPC) Apply Two-Person Concept procedures during training with non-war reserve assets to the extent necessary to maintain proficiency.
1.2.2. Enforces the Two-Person Concept
1.2.2. (AFSPC) Before entering a no-lone zone, brief personnel that the Two-Person Concept applies. Supervisors must ensure that individuals are aware of the location of all no-lone zone boundaries, location of certified critical components within the no-lone zone, emergency procedures, and methods for reporting violations and hazards. Do not use signs or devices externally that identify a building as a no-lone zone.
1.2.3. Develops procedures to limit entry to authorized persons who meet the requirements of paragraph 1.3.
1.2.3. (AFSPC) After entry into a no-lone zone, the supervisor/team chief of each authorized team controls individual team members within the no-lone zone.
1.2.4. (Added-AFSPC) After initial entry of an authorized Two-Person Concept team into a no-lone zone, a single, authorized individual may enter providing:
1.2.4.1. (Added-AFSPC) The Sole Vouching Authority (SVA) identifies individuals wishing to gain entry to a no-lone zone, verifies authorization, and validates need for entry into the no-lone zone. Note: SVA is the representative identified as having responsibility for deciding who will enter the no-lone zone. Normally, this is the senior member of the first team entering the area. SVA may transfer between individuals provided the two individuals jointly identify
1.2.5. (Added-AFSPC) An area designated as a no-lone zone may be defined as the interior of a cabinet, a work bay or equipment bay; an entire structure or building, a junction box, a drawer, an area encompassed by an actual boundary established by painted markings, rope, or a fence; and in some instances, the interior of vehicles. Local commanders are authorized to enlarge a no-lone zone. This authority should be used sparingly and only when absolutely required. When used for unattended storage of nuclear weapons or certified critical components the no-lone zone must meet the requirements of AFI 31-101, The Air Force Installation Security Program, and AFI
1.2.5.7. (Added-AFSPC) Any room, computer facility, vault, or similar area where certified critical components are repaired (operationally certified or decertified), manufactured, stored, or processed, is a no-lone zone. For an area in which maintenance is infrequently performed on certified critical components, establish a temporary no-lone zone with signs placed around the work area while components are present.

1.3. Team Requirements. (Refer to paragraph 1.1.6.1 for criteria on foreign nationals.) A Two-Person Concept team consists of at least two individuals who:
1.3.1. Are certified under the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), as specified in AFI 36-2104, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program(formerly AFR 35-99 and AFR 40-925).
1.3.1. (AFSPC) Inspectors or evaluators who meet the requirements of paragraph 1.3. may form a Two-Person Concept team in the performance of their duties.
1.3.2. Know the nuclear surety requirements of the task they perform.
1.3.3. Can promptly detect an incorrect act or unauthorized procedure.
1.3.4. Have successfully completed nuclear surety training according to AFI 91-101.
1.3.5. Are designated to perform the required task.
1.4. (AFSPC) Violations to Report. Report violations of the Two-Person Concept, including emergency response, through the command post to the commander. The commander will ensure violations are investigated promptly. A Two-Person Concept team must ascertain if unauthorized acts were performed, inspect involved certified critical components, verify their status, and reestablish the integrity of the system. Accomplish applicable visual and functional checks for components that have such procedures established.
1.6.4. PRP Interim-Certified Personnel Restrictions. Two interim-certified individuals may not form a Two-Person Concept team. Also, do not allow an interim-certified member to pilot a single-seat aircraft loaded with nuclear weapons.
TAMPER DETECTION PROGRAM
2. Tamper Detection Program. Seals help to verify that no one has tampered with or accidentally activated a certified critical component.
2.1. Sealing Requirements. Certain items must be sealed because either:
2.1.1. Air Force nuclear weapon system safety rules require it, or,
2.1.2. In the case of some certified critical components, seals protect their certification status while in storage or during transportation, as specified in AFI 91-105, Critical Components (formerly AFR 122-17).
2.2. Sealing Methods. Authorized sealing methods include:
2.2.1. Safety Wiring and Lead Seals. In this method, you place a lead seal on a safety wire connected to certain switches, covers, handles, or levers and impress the lead seal with a distinctive mark using a crimping device and controlled die. An unauthorized act breaks or alters the wire connection so that you can detect activation. Use this method only in no-lone zones.
2.2.2. Tamper Detection Indicators (TDI). In this method you place an approved TDI so that it will indicate when someone has activated or had

access to the interior of a certified critical component. Once the TDI is installed, evidence of tampering is visible to the naked eye or can be detected through the use of special equipment.
3.3.1. (AFSPC) Where AFSPC directives do not cover a particular local situation, wings will develop local standard publications or checklists to ensure adequate control of certified critical components or nuclear weapons and application of the Tamper Control and Detection Programs.
3.3.2. Develop and distribute procedures for sealing, where appropriate. As a minimum, these procedural directives:
3.3.2.1. State when and by whom seals can be applied and removed.
3.3.2.1. (AFSPC) Units will designate personnel authorized to apply and remove tamper
detection indicators (TDI). TDIs will be applied and removed by a Two-Person Concept team when required by technical orders or directives.
3.3.2.2. Establish controls for the handling, receipt, storage, issue, inventory, and disposal of TDIs (including all residue), controlled dies and self-locking, non-reversible seals. (example: roto-seals)
3.3.2.2. (AFSPC) Develop local controls for handling, receipt, storage, issue, inventory, and disposal of TDIs not covered in technical orders, directives or this supplement.
3.3.2.2.1. (Added-AFSPC) The Aquila Cobra Seal TDI-1 (ACSTDI-1) is used to maintain certification of the Missile Guidance Set (MGS) during shipment. Task-qualified personnel must install, remove, and verify the ACSTDI-1.
3.3.2.2.2. (Added-AFSPC) The ACSTD-1 system kit requires special handling. The kit
which includes special tools, camera, printer, video disks, ACSTDI-1 bodies, and fiber
optic cables does not require special handling. Maintain the video disk used during the
ACSTDI-1 installation process under proper Two-Person Concept control until all information recorded on the disk has been properly verified by the unit receiving the MGS. Maintain the master pictures taken during the installation process under Two-Person Concept
control until TDIs on MGS shipping containers are verified by the receiving unit.
3.3.2.2.3. (Added-AFSPC) Prior to shipping a certified MGS to another unit, ensure the
receiving unit has a copy of the master pictures taken during the seal installation process.
Transmit the master pictures by facsimile machine or overnight mail. Immediately upon

receipt of the master pictures the receiving unit will contact the sending unit via telephone to confirm that the pictures have been received and are under Two-Person Concept control. The sending unit will verify the caller,s identity by immediate call back. Accomplish this verification procedure prior to shipping the MGS.
3.3.2.2.4. (Added-AFSPC) The sending unit must inspect installed ACSTDI-1s immediately prior to loading the MGS shipping container for shipment. The same inspection is performed upon receipt of the MGS.
3.3.2.2.5. (Added-AFSPC) Dispose of the ACSTDI-1 by destroying the body and discarding it along with the cables.

Staging Nukes for Iran?

Staging Nukes for Iran?
Published on Thursday, September 06, 2007.
Source: No Quarter - Larry Johnson
http://noquarterusa.net/blog/2007/09/05/staging-nukes-for-iran/
Why the hubbub over a B-52 taking off from a B-52 base in Minot, North Dakota and subsequently landing at a B-52 base in Barksdale, Louisiana? That's like getting excited if you see a postal worker in uniform walking out of a post office. And how does someone watching a B-52 land identify the cruise missiles as nukes? It just does not make sense.
So I called a old friend and retired B-52 pilot and asked him. What he told me offers one compelling case of circumstantial evidence. My buddy, let's call him Jack D. Ripper, reminded me that the only times you put weapons on a plane is when they are on alert or if you are tasked to move the weapons to a specific site.
Then he told me something I had not heard before.
Barksdale Air Force Base is being used as a jumping off point for Middle East operations. Gee, why would we want cruise missile nukes at Barksdale Air Force Base. Can't imagine we would need to use them in Iraq. Why would we want to preposition nuclear weapons at a base conducting Middle East operations?
His final point was to observe that someone on the inside obviously leaked the info that the planes were carrying nukes. A B-52 landing at Barksdale is a non-event. A B-52 landing with nukes. That is something else.
Now maybe there is an innocent explanation for this? I can't think of one. What is certain is that the pilots of this plane did not just make a last minute decision to strap on some nukes and take them for a joy ride. We need some tough questions and clear answers. What the hell is going on? Did someone at Barksdale try to indirectly warn the American people

that the Bush Administration is staging nukes for Iran? I don't know, but it is a question worth asking.

Talkin' World War III

Talkin' World War III: The return of the repressed.
By Ron Rosenbaum
Nov. 29, 2007
http://www.slate.com/id/2178792/

Could we have a little talk about World War III? It's back again, that phrase, and it doesn't look like it's going to go away soon.

This past month may be remembered as the one when World War III broke out. Not the thing itself, obviously, but the concept, the memory, the nightmare, which had been buried in the basement of our cultural consciousness since the end of the Cold War. The beast suddenly broke out of the basement and it's in our face again. The return of the repressed.

There was George Bush's Oct. 17 warning that "if you're interested in avoiding World War III," you ought to worry about the prospect of Iranian nukes. Many found the phrase jolting, coming out of the blue. First, because it had not been in widespread use, certainly not from a White House podium, and second because "World War III" generally connotes a global nuclear war, while Bush was speaking about regional scenarios involving Iran and Israel. Why the sudden rhetorical escalation? Especially coming from the man who has the "nuclear football," the black briefcase with the Emergency War Orders, always by his side, and enough megatonnage at his disposal to threaten the existence of the entire human race.

Then, a few days after Bush's Oct. 17 shocker, I came upon a less widely noticed, perhaps even more ominous quote, originally published two weeks earlier in London's usually reliable Spectator, in a story about the Sept. 6 Israeli raid on that alleged Syrian nuclear facility. A quote from a "very senior British ministerial source" contending, "[I]f people had known how close we came to world war three that day there'd have been mass panic." Here, it wasn't Bush theorizing about the future; it was a responsible official saying we'd already come close to Armageddon.

And then there was the "mistake" that came to light about the same time as the Israeli raid, the mistake in nuclear weapons handling, which allowed—for the first time in 40 years—six nuclear warheads to be flown over U.S. airspace, suspended from the wing of a long-range B-52 bomber en route from Minot, N.D., to Barksdale, La., a staging point for Mideast missions. And though the incident appears to have been an

accident, it set off seething blogospheric speculation about its connection to the Israeli raid, and a prospective U.S. raid on Iran. Could it have been a signal of sorts? Even if it was a simple error, the unauthorized flight of the exposed nukes betrayed profound flaws in our control of our nuclear arsenal. Suddenly, the bombs that we knew, on some level, were there somewhere, were out in the open, waving: Hey, we're still here!

And now we have the crisis in Pakistan, one that portends a nightmare scenario in which Pakistan's so-called "Islamic bomb" falls into the hands of al-Qaida sympathizers. Such an outcome would put us on a fast-track route to World War III, because logic would dictate an immediate attack on those Pakistani nukes before they could be dispersed or launched, and logic on the other side would dictate that their new possessors launch or disperse them as soon as possible under a "use it or lose it" threat.

Finally, there was the almost unprecedented declassification of an element of the U.S. nuclear war plan formerly known as the Strategic Integrated Operating Plan, now called OPLAN 8044. The heavily redacted document, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by Hans M. Kristensen, a nuke specialist at the Federation of American Scientists, is almost completely blanked out, save for a few headings suggesting that we have off-the-shelf plans for nuking "regional" states, a phrase Kristensen believes applies to states that have weapons of mass destruction programs, such as North Korea and Iran. Soon, if not already, one can be sure, there will be "robust contingency plans" for Pakistan, as Martin Walker put it recently in the New York Times.

And—as if demonstrating a kind of synchronicity in the collective unconscious—the cultural realm has begun to break out with World War III talk. We've had publication of two new books, Richard Rhodes' history of the Cold War nuclear arms race, Arsenals of Folly, which takes us up to 1986 and the failure of the superpowers to ban the bomb, and Jonathan Schell's utopian revival of the cause of nuclear abolitionism in The Seventh Decade.

Read the rest at: http://www.slate.com/id/2178792/

The Official (Cover) Story? WaPo on "Missteps in the Bunker"

The saga of a 'Bent Spear' 6 nukes fly across U.S.; no one notices for 36 hours — how could it happen?

By Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers

Sunday, September 23, 2007
Go to Original.

> The warheads were attached to the plane in Minot without special guard for more than 15 hours, and they remained on the plane in Louisiana for nearly nine hours more before being discovered. In total, the warheads slipped from the Air Force's nuclear safety net for more than a day without anyone's knowledge.

Just after 9 a.m. on Aug. 29, a group of U.S. airmen entered a sod-covered bunker on North Dakota's Minot Air Force Base with orders to collect a set of unarmed cruise missiles bound for a weapons graveyard. They quickly pulled out a dozen cylinders, all of which appeared identical from a cursory glance, and hauled them along Bomber Boulevard to a waiting B-52 bomber.

The airmen attached the gray missiles to the plane's wings, six on each side. After eyeballing the missiles on the right side, a flight officer signed a manifest that listed a dozen unarmed AGM-129 missiles. The officer did not notice that the six on the left contained nuclear warheads, each with the destructive power of up to 10 Hiroshima bombs.

That detail would escape notice for an astounding 36 hours, during which the missiles were flown across the country to a Louisiana air base that had no idea nuclear warheads were coming. It was the first known flight by a nuclear-armed bomber over U.S. airspace, without special high-level authorization, in nearly 40 years.

The episode, serious enough to trigger a rare "Bent Spear" nuclear incident report that raced through the chain of command to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and President Bush, provoked new questions inside and outside the Pentagon about the adequacy of U.S. nuclear weapons safeguards while the military's attention and resources are devoted to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Three weeks after word of the incident leaked to the public, new details obtained by The Washington Post point to security failures at multiple levels in North Dakota and Louisiana, according to interviews with current and former U.S. officials briefed on the initial results of an Air Force investigation of the incident.

The warheads were attached to the plane in Minot without special guard for more than 15 hours, and they remained on the plane in Louisiana for nearly nine hours more before being discovered. In total, the warheads slipped from the Air Force's nuclear safety net for more than a day without anyone's knowledge.

"I have been in the nuclear business since 1966 and am not aware of any incident more disturbing," retired Air Force Gen. Eugene Habiger, who served as U.S. Strategic Command chief from 1996 to 1998, said in an interview.

A simple error in a missile storage room led to missteps at every turn, as ground crews failed to notice the warheads, and as security teams and flight crew members failed to provide adequate oversight and check the cargo thoroughly. An elaborate nuclear safeguard system, nurtured during the Cold War and infused with rigorous accounting and command procedures, was utterly debased, the investigation's early results show.

The incident came on the heels of multiple warnings -- some of which went to the highest levels of the Bush administration, including the National Security Council -- of security problems at Air Force installations where nuclear weapons are kept. The risks are not that warheads might be accidentally detonated, but that sloppy procedures could leave room for theft or damage to a warhead, disseminating its toxic nuclear materials.

A former National Security Council staff member with detailed knowledge described the event as something that people in the White House "have been assured never could happen." What occurred on Aug. 29-30, the former official said, was "a breakdown at a number of levels involving flight crew, munitions, storage and tracking procedures -- faults that never were to line up on a single day."

Missteps in the Bunker

The air base where the incident took place is one of the most remote and, for much of the year, coldest military posts in the continental United States. Veterans of Minot typically describe their assignments by counting the winters passed in the flat, treeless region where January temperatures sometimes reach 30 below zero. In airman-speak, a three-year assignment becomes "three winters" at Minot.

The daily routine for many of Minot's crews is a cycle of scheduled maintenance for the base's 35 aging B-52H Stratofortress bombers -- mammoth, eight-engine workhorses, the newest of which left the assembly line more than 45 years ago. Workers also tend to 150 intercontinental ballistic missiles kept at the ready in silos scattered across neighboring cornfields, as well as hundreds of smaller nuclear bombs, warheads and vehicles stored in sod-covered bunkers called igloos.

"We had a continuous workload in maintaining" warheads, said Scott Vest, a former Air Force captain who spent time in Minot's bunkers in the 1990s. "We had a stockpile of more than 400 . . . and some of them were always coming due" for service.

Among the many weapons and airframes, the AGM-129 cruise missile was well known at the base as a nuclear warhead delivery system carried by B-52s. With its unique shape and design, it is easily distinguished from the older AGM-86, which can be fitted with either a nuclear or a conventional warhead.

Last fall, after 17 years in the U.S. arsenal, the Air Force's more than 400 AGM-129s were ordered into retirement by then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. Minot was told to begin shipping out the unarmed missiles in small groups to Barksdale Air Force Base near Shreveport, La., for storage. By Aug. 29, its crews had already sent more than 200 missiles to Barksdale and knew the drill by heart.

The Air Force's account of what happened that day and the next was provided by multiple sources who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the government's investigation is continuing and classified.

At 9:12 a.m. local time on Aug. 29, according to the account, ground crews in two trucks entered a gated compound at Minot known as the Weapons Storage Area and drove to an igloo where the cruise missiles were stored. The 21-foot missiles were already mounted on pylons, six apiece in clusters of three, for quick mounting to the wings of a B-52.

The AGM-129 is designed to carry silver W-80-1 nuclear warheads, which have a variable yield of between 5 and 150 kilotons. (A kiloton is equal to the explosive force of 1,000 tons of TNT.) The warheads were meant to have been removed from the missiles before shipment. In their place, crews were supposed to insert metal dummies of the same size and weight, but a different color, so the missiles could still be properly attached under the bomber's wings.

A munitions custodian officer is supposed to keep track of the nuclear warheads. In the case of cruise missiles, a stamp-size window on the missile's frame allows workers to peer inside to check whether the warheads within are silver. In many cases, a red ribbon or marker attached to the missile serves as an additional warning. Finally, before the missiles are moved, two-man teams are supposed to look at check sheets, bar codes and serial numbers denoting whether the missiles are armed.

Why the warheads were not noticed in this case is not publicly known. But once the missiles were certified as unarmed, a requirement for unique security precautions when nuclear warheads are moved -- such as the presence of specially armed security police, the approval of a senior base commander and a special tracking system -- evaporated.

The trucks hauled the missile pylons from the bunker into the bustle of normal air base traffic, onto Bomber Boulevard and M Street, before turning onto a tarmac apron where the missiles were loaded onto the B-

52. The loading took eight hours because of unusual trouble attaching the pylon on the right side of the plane -- the one with the dummy warheads. By 5:12 p.m., the B-52 was fully loaded. The plane then sat on the tarmac overnight without special guards, protected for 15 hours by only the base's exterior chain-link fence and roving security patrols.

Air Force rules required members of the jet's flight crew to examine all of the missiles and warheads before the plane took off. But in this instance, just one person examined only the six unarmed missiles and inexplicably skipped the armed missiles on the left, according to officials familiar with the probe.

"If they're not expecting a live warhead it may be a very casual thing -- there's no need to set up the security system and play the whole nuclear game," said Vest, the former Minot airman. "As for the air crew, they're bus drivers at this point, as far as they know."

The plane, which had flown to Minot for the mission and was not certified to carry nuclear weapons, departed the next morning for Louisiana. When the bomber landed at Barksdale at 11:23 a.m., the air crew signed out and left for lunch, according to the probe.

It would be another nine hours -- until 8:30 p.m. -- before a Barksdale ground crew turned up at the parked aircraft to begin removing the missiles. At 8:45, 15 minutes into the task, a separate missile transport crew arrived in trucks. One of these airmen noticed something unusual about the missiles. Within an hour, a skeptical supervisor had examined them and ordered them secured.

By then it was 10 p.m., more than 36 hours after the warheads left their secure bunker in Minot.

Once the errant warheads were discovered, Air Force officers in Louisiana were alarmed enough to immediately notify the National Military Command Center, a highly secure area of the Pentagon that serves as the nerve center for U.S. nuclear war planning. Such "Bent Spear" events are ranked second in seriousness only to "Broken Arrow" incidents, which involve the loss, destruction or accidental detonation of a nuclear weapon.

The Air Force decided at first to keep the mishap under wraps, in part because of policies that prohibit the confirmation of any details about the storage or movement of nuclear weapons. No public acknowledgment was made until service members leaked the story to the Military Times, which published a brief account Sept. 5.

Officials familiar with the Bent Spear report say Air Force officials apparently did not anticipate that the episode would cause public concern. One passage in the report contains these four words:

"No press interest anticipated."

'What the Hell Happened Here?'

The news, when it did leak, provoked a reaction within the defense and national security communities that bordered on disbelief: How could so many safeguards, drilled into generations of nuclear weapons officers and crews, break down at once?

Military officers, nuclear weapons analysts and lawmakers have expressed concern that it was not just a fluke, but a symptom of deeper problems in the handling of nuclear weapons now that Cold War anxieties have abated.

"It is more significant than people first realized, and the more you look at it, the stranger it is," said Joseph Cirincione, director for nuclear policy at the Center for American Progress think tank and the author of a history of nuclear weapons. "These weapons -- the equivalent of 60 Hiroshimas -- were out of authorized command and control for more than a day."

The Air Force has sought to offer assurances that its security system is working. Within days, the service relieved one Minot officer of his command and disciplined several airmen, while assigning a major general to head an investigation that has already been extended for extra weeks. At the same time, Defense Department officials have announced that a Pentagon-appointed scientific advisory board will study the mishap as part of a larger review of procedures for handling nuclear weapons.

"Clearly this incident was unacceptable on many levels," said an Air Force spokesman, Lt. Col. Edward Thomas. "Our response has been swift and focused -- and it has really just begun. We will spend many months at the air staff and at our commands and bases ensuring that the root causes are addressed."

While Air Force officials see the Minot event as serious, they also note that it was harmless, since the six nuclear warheads never left the military's control. Even if the bomber had crashed, or if someone had stolen the warheads, fail-safe devices would have prevented a nuclear detonation.

But independent experts warn that whenever nuclear weapons are not properly safeguarded, their fissile materials are at risk of theft and diversion. Moreover, if the plane had crashed and the warheads' casings cracked, these highly toxic materials could have been widely dispersed.

"When what were multiple layers of tight nuclear weapon control internal procedures break down, some bad guy may eventually come along and take advantage of them," said a former senior administration official who had responsibility for nuclear security.

Some Air Force veterans say the base's officers made an egregious mistake in allowing nuclear-warhead-equipped missiles and unarmed missiles to be stored in the same bunker, a practice that a spokesman last week confirmed is routine. Charles Curtis, a former deputy energy

secretary in the Clinton administration, said, "We always relied on segregation of nuclear weapons from conventional ones."

Former nuclear weapons officials have noted that the weapons transfer at the heart of the incident coincides with deep cuts in deployed nuclear forces that will bring the total number of warheads to as few as 1,700 by the year 2012 -- a reduction of more than 50 percent from 2001 levels. But the downsizing has created new accounting and logistical challenges, since U.S. policy is to keep thousands more warheads in storage, some as a strategic reserve and others awaiting dismantling.

A secret 1998 history of the Air Combat Command warned of "diminished attention for even 'the minimum standards' of nuclear weapons' maintenance, support and security" once such arms became less vital, according to a declassified copy obtained by Hans Kristensen, director of the Federation of American Scientists' nuclear information project.

The Air Force's inspector general in 2003 found that half of the "nuclear surety" inspections conducted that year resulted in failing grades -- the worst performance since inspections of weapons-handling began. Minot's 5th Bomb Wing was among the units that failed, and the Louisiana-based 2nd Bomb Wing at Barksdale garnered an unsatisfactory rating in 2005. Both units passed subsequent nuclear inspections, and Minot was given high marks in a 2006 inspection. The 2003 report on the 5th Bomb Wing attributed its poor performance to the demands of supporting combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Wartime stresses had "resulted in a lack of time to focus and practice nuclear operations," the report stated.

Last year, the Air Force eliminated a separate nuclear-operations directorate known informally as the N Staff, which closely tracked the maintenance and security of nuclear weapons in the United States and other NATO countries. Currently, nuclear and space operations are combined in a single directorate. Air Force officials say the change was part of a service-wide reorganization and did not reflect diminished importance of nuclear operations.

"Where nuclear weapons have receded into the background is at the senior policy level, where there are other things people have to worry about," said Linton F. Brooks, who resigned in January as director of the National Nuclear Security Administration. Brooks, who oversaw billions of dollars in U.S. spending to help Russia secure its nuclear stockpile, said the mishandling of U.S. warheads indicates that "something went seriously wrong."

A similar refrain has been voiced hundreds of times in blogs and chat rooms popular with former and current military members. On a Web site run by the Military Times, a former B-52 crew chief who did not give his name wrote: "What the hell happened here?"

A former Air Force senior master sergeant wrote separately that "mistakes were made at the lowest level of supervision and this snowballed into the one of the biggest mistakes in USAF history. I am still scratching my head wondering how this could [have] happened."

Three recent deaths of Air Force personnel: Are they stopping the whistleblowers?

This is from the Wayne Madsen Report, so if you circulate, please attribute to WMR. I have shared this with the Oregonian columnist we met with two weeks ago (mid-August) to try to spur more investigation into the death that occurred in the Portland area. The update at the bottom explains the second death, and the third concerns a person who was mowed down by a forklift, and it might be totally unrelated.

Sept. 14-16, 2007 -- UPDATED -- The suspicious circumstances surrounding the death of a US Air Force Special Operations Command officer

Wayne Madsen Report
Sep 14, 2007

We live in dangerous times. With fascism comes to inevitability of extra-judicial murders being carried out by the government. The "disappeared" of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia in Henry Kissinger's "Operation Condor" are a bloody testament to extra-judicial killings. And the names Tillman, Westhusing, Kokal, Weiss, and others are now joined by Sergeants Omar Mora and Yance Gray, two authors of an August 18, 2007, New York Times op-ed opposing the Iraq war who were recently killed in a vehicle "accident" in Iraq. Staff Sergeant Jeremy Murphy, another author of the anti-war article, was shot in the head in Iraq while the article was being written. Murphy is recovering from his wounds in a U.S. military hospital.

When the body of Air Force Captain John Frueh was found near his rental car near Badger Peak in northeast Skamania County, Washington on September 8, questions began to be asked. Frueh was assigned to “Operations Weather” for the Air Force Special Operations Command at Hurlburt Field in Florida. Hurlburt is the headquarters for the Air Force's special forces activities. Frueh was a veteran of special forces combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. He had flown to Portland, Oregon to attend his best friend's September 2 wedding. Frueh was to have returned to Florida on September 4.

No cause of death was given by the authorities. Frueh had flown to Portland on August 25 to attend his friend's wedding. According to The Oregonian, Frueh had last spoken to his family in Florida on August 30 after renting a car at Portland International Airport. Frueh was 33, married, and a father of two young children.

Captain Frueh: Air Force Special Ops officer and another suspicious death.

Why would Frueh driven a long distance from Portland to Washington? Frueh was last seen on August 29 going for a walk in Nob Hill, in northwest Portland. He was carrying in his backpack a camcorder, Global Positioning System (GPS), camera, and cell phone. According to the Portland Police, the last call from Frueh's cell phone was at 12:29 pm on August 29 from the intersection of I-205 and S.E. Mill Plain Road in Vancouver, Washington, ironically, close to a Search and Rescue facility. There is also the question as to how Frueh traveled to a stop off of the interstate highway in Vancouver, Washington on August 29 if he did not rent his car at Portland International until the next day, August 30, the same day his family in Florida last heard from him by phone. Considering Frueh's last cell phone call was on August 29 from Vancouver, why did he presumably use a pay phone to call his family in Florida?

Frueh's last reported phone call at Portland airport came on the same day, August 30, that five or six nuclear weapons aboard a B-52 supposedly went "missing" during a flight from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. Frueh's position in the headquarters of the U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command "weather operations" would have given him access to a highly classified information.

Suicide in this case appears highly unlikely. Frueh had recently been selected for Major. He was attending his best friend's wedding and he had a wife and two children. Police in Washington state immediately ruled out foul play in Frueh's death. A report was floated that he suffered from a "medical condition."

There is something definitely amiss in the U.S. armed forces. George Bush's lickspittle general, David Petreaus, reportedly harbors presidential ambitions. Admiral William Fallon, Petraeus' boss as the Commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is quoted as saying Petraeus is "an ass-kissing little chickenshit," adding "I hate people like that."

It is noteworthy that Fallon was not asked to testify before Congress about Iraq. Every faltering dictatorship experiences internecine feuds within the military. It was true with Czarist Russia, Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and the Colonels' Greece. It is also true with the United States.

UPDATE 9/14/07 -- Captain Frueh was not the only suspicious Air Force death in recent weeks. KXMC-TV in Minot, North Dakota has reported

that 20 year old Airman First Class Todd Blue died on September 10 while visiting his family in Wytheville, Virginia. Blue was assigned to the 5th Security Forces at Minot Air Force Base last August. Authorities have not released details on Blue's death. Lt. Col. Paul Wheeless, the commander of the 5th Security Forces Munitions Squadron was fired over the recent "loss" of five or six nuclear-armed cruise missiles loaded at Minot aboard a B-52 destined for Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates ordered a clamp down on any information about the B-52 incident being disseminated to the press. However, what we now know about the nuclear weapons "incident" and two suspicious Air Force deaths within the continental United States, coupled with the feud between General Petraeus and Admiral Fallon, all point to something seriously wrong within the ranks of the military.

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Being “Guarded” by Israel

Go to Original.

American supporters of Israel were delighted to learn that an Israeli company, Magal Security Systems—owned in part by the government of Israel—is in charge of security for the most sensitive nuclear power and weapons storage facilities in the United States.

The largest perimeter security company in the world, Magal started out as a division of Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI)—which was owned in part by the government of Israel. In recent years, however, Magal evolved into a publicly-traded company, although IAI (and thus the government of Israel) still holds a substantial share in the highly successful firm.

What all of this means is that the government of Israel will actually have control over the security of America’s nuclear weapons.

Supporters of Israel say that this is a splendid idea, since Israel is said to be perhaps America’s closest ally on the face of the planet. However, there are some critics who question the propriety of America’s super-sensitive nuclear security being in the hands of any foreign nation, particularly Israel which, even today, officially denies that it is engaged in the production of nuclear arms.

Be that as it may, however, Magal’s global interests are quite broad-ranging. Having secured 90 percent of Israel’s borders through a wide-ranging array of super-modern “space age” technology, Magal has now branched out internationally. Not only does Magal provide security for

American nuclear facilities, but it also does likewise for most major nuclear facilities in Western Europe and Asia.

Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?

September 7, 2007
Was a Covert Attempt to Bomb Iran with Nuclear Weapons foiled by a Military Leak?
By Michael Salla

Introduction: The B-52 Incident

On August 30, a B-52 bomber armed with five nuclear-tipped Advanced Cruise missiles traveled from Minot Air Force base, North Dakota, to Barksdale Air Force base, Louisiana. Each missile had an adjustable yield between five and 150 kilotons of TNT which is at the lower end of the destructive capacities of U.S. nuclear weapons. For example, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima had a yield of 13 kilotons, while the Bravo Hydrogen bomb test of 1954 had a yield of 15,000 kilotons. The B-52 story was first covered in the Army Times on September 5 after the nuclear armed aircraft was discovered by Airmen (see: http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/09/marine_nuclear_B52_070904w/). What made this a very significant event was that it was a violation of U.S. Air Force regulations concerning the transportation of nuclear weapons by air. Nuclear weapons are normally transported by air in specially constructed planes designed to prevent radioactive pollution in case of a crash. Such transport planes are not equipped to launch the nuclear weapons they routinely carry around the U.S. and the world for servicing or positioning.

The discovery of the nuclear armed B-52 was, according to Hans Kristensen, a nuclear weapons expert at the Federation of American Scientists, the first time in 40 years that a nuclear armed plane had been allowed to fly in the U.S (see: http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_9_5.html#149D6ECF). Since 1968, after a SAC bomber crashed in Greenland, all nuclear armed aircraft have been grounded but were kept on a constant state of alert. After the end of the Cold War, President George H. Bush ordered in 1991 that nuclear weapons were to be removed from all aircraft and stored in nearby facilities.

Recently, the Air Force began decommissioning its stockpile of Advanced Cruise missiles. The five nuclear weapons on the B-52 were to be decommissioned, and were to be taken to another Air Force base. An Air Force press statement issued on September 6 claimed that there “was an error which occurred during a regularly scheduled transfer of weapons between two bases.” Furthermore, the statement declared: “The Air Force maintains the highest standards of safety and precision so any deviation from these well established munitions procedures is considered very serious.” The issue concerning how a nuclear armed B-52 bomber was allowed to take off and fly in U.S. air space after an ‘error’ in a routine transfer process, is now subject to an official Air Force inquiry which is due to be completed by September 14.

Three key questions emerge over the B-52 incident. First, why did Air Force personnel at Minot AFB not spot the ‘error’ earlier given the elaborate security procedures in place to prevent such mistakes from occurring? Many military analysts have commented on the stringent security procedures in place to prevent this sort of mistake from occurring. Multiple officers are routinely involved in the transportation and loading of nuclear weapons to prevent the kind of ‘error’ that allegedly occurred in the B-52 incident. According to the Air Force statement, the commanding officer in charge of military munitions personnel and additional munitions airmen were relieved of duties pending the completion of the investigation. According to Kristensen, the error could not have come from confusing the Advanced Cruise Missile with a conventional weapons since no conventional form exists. So the munitions Airmen should have been easily able to spot the mistake. Other routine procedures were violated which suggests a rather obvious explanation for the error. The military munitions personnel were acting under direct orders, though not through the regular chain of military command. This takes me to the second question.

Who was in Charge of the B-52 Incident?

Who ordered the loading of Advanced Cruise missiles on to a B-52 in violation of Air Force regulations? The quick reaction of the Air Force and the issuing of a public statement describing the seriousness of the issue and the launch of an immediate investigation, suggests that whatever occurred, was outside the regular chain of military command. If the regular chain of command was violated, then we have to inquire as to whether the B-52 incident was part of a covert project whose classification level exceeded that held by officers in charge of nuclear weapons at Minot AFB. The most obvious governmental entity that may have ordered the nuclear arming of the B-52 outside the regular chain of military command is the last remaining bastion of neo-conservative activism in the Bush administration.

Vice President Cheney has taken a very prominent role in covert military operations and training exercises designed for the “seamless integration” of different national security and military authorities to possible terrorist attacks. On May 8, 2001, President Bush placed Cheney in charge of "[A]ll federal programs dealing with weapons of mass destruction, consequence management within the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other federal agencies" (see: http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/011805_simplify_case.shtml) . Cheney subsequently played a direct role in supervising training exercises that simultaneously occurred during the 911 attacks. According to former Los Angeles Police Officer Michael Ruppert, Cheney had a parallel chain of command that he used to override Air Force objections to stand down orders that grounded the USAF during the 911 attacks (see: http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/011805_simplify_case.shtml). Ruppert learned that the Secret Service had the authority to directly communicate presidential and vice presidential orders to fighter pilots in the air thereby circumventing the normal chain of command. (Crossing the Rubicon, pp. 428 – 429). Furthermore: “It is the Secret Service who has the legal mandate to take supreme command in case of a scheduled major event - or an unplanned major emergency - on American soil; these are designated "National Special Security Events".” http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/011805_simplify_case.shtml. Ruppert and others have subsequently claimed that 911 was an “inside job;” and Cheney through the Secret Service, played a direct leadership role in what occurred over 911. Consequently, it is very possible that Cheney played a similar role in circumventing the regular chain of military command in ordering the B-52 incident. It is likely that the B-52 incident was part of a contrived "National Special Security Event" directly controlled by Cheney by virtue of the authority granted to him by President Bush, and through the Secret Service which has the technological means to by pass the regular chain of military command. I now move to my third key question.

Why was the nuclear armed B-52 sent to Barksdale AFB?

If initial reports that the weapons were being decommissioned, but were mistakenly transported by a B-52 bomber, then the weapons should have been taken to Kirtland Air Force Base. According to Kristensen, this is “where the warheads are separated from the rest of the weapon and shipped to the Energy Department’s Pantex dismantlement facility near Amarillo, Texas” (see: http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_9_5.html#149D6ECF). However, it has been revealed that Barksdale AFB is used as a staging

base for operations in the Middle East (see: http://tpmcafe.com/blog/coffeehouse/2007/sep/05/staging_nuke_for_iran) . This is circumstantial evidence that the weapons were being deployed for possible use in the Middle East.

There has been recent speculation concerning a possible attack against Iran given reports that the Pentagon has completed plans for a three day bombing blitz of Iran according to a Sunday Times report (see: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article2369001.ece). The Report claims that 1200 targets have been selected and this will destroy much of Iran's military infrastructure. Such an attack will devastate Iran's economy, create greater political instability in the region, and stop the oil supply. A disruption of the oil supply from the Persian Gulf could trigger a global economic recession and lead to the collapse of financial markets. In a synchronistic development, there have been reports of billion dollar investments in high risk stock options in both Europe and the U.S. that would only be profitable if a dramatic collapse of the stock market were to occur before September 21. Similar stock options were purchased weeks before the 911 attack in 2001, and investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission for possible insider trading. The combination of the Sunday Times report and the Stock market option purchases is circumstantial evidence that plans for a concerted military attack against Iran have been secretly approved and covert operations have begun (see: http://exopolitics.org/Exo-Comment-57.htm).

Seymour Hersh in May 2006 reported the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the use of nuclear weapons against Iran.

In late April, the military leadership, headed by General Pace, achieved a major victory when the White House dropped its insistence that the plan for a bombing campaign include the possible use of a nuclear device to destroy Iran's uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz, nearly two hundred miles south of Tehran. …. "Bush and Cheney were dead serious about the nuclear planning," the former senior intelligence official told me. "And Pace stood up to them. Then the world came back: 'O.K., the nuclear option is politically unacceptable.'

http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/07/10/060710fa_fact .

Given earlier opposition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is likely that the present attack plans for Iraq drawn up by the Pentagon don't involve the use of nuclear weapons. In order to circumvent the regular chain of command, opposed to a nuclear attack, it is very likely that Vice President Cheney contrived a "National Special Security Event" that involved a nuclear armed B-52. This would have given him the legal authority to place orders directly through the Secret Service to the Air Force officers responsible for the B-52 incident.

Conclusion: Exposing those Responsible for the B-52 Incident

Consequently, there is considerable circumstantial evidence to argue that the nuclear armed B-52 was part of a covert operation, outside the regular chain of military command. The most plausible authority responsible for this was Vice President Cheney. He very likely used the Secret Service to take charge of a contrived National Special Security Event involving a nuclear armed B-52 that would be flown from Minot AFB. The B-52 was directed to Barksdale Air Force base where it would have conducted a covert mission to the Middle East involving the detonation of one or more nuclear weapons most likely in or in the vicinity of Iran. This could either have occurred during a conventional military strike against Iran, or a False Flag operation in the Persian Gulf region. The leaking and discovery of the nuclear armed B-52 at Barksdale was not part of the script. According to a confidential source of Larry Johnson, a former counter-terrorism official from the State Department and CIA, the discovery of the nuclear armed B-52 was leaked. Johnson concludes: "Did someone at Barksdale try to indirectly warn the American people that the Bush Administration is staging nukes for Iran? I don't know, but it is a question worth asking."

http://tpmcafe.com/blog/coffeehouse/2007/sep/05/staging_nuke_for_iran

While the general public is likely to be given a watered down declassified report by the Air Force over the B-52 incident on September 14, the real investigation will reveal that it was part of a covert operation that intended to bypass the regular chain of command in using nuclear weapons in the Middle East. This will likely result in a furious backlash by key figures in the regular military chain of Command such as Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, and the Commander of Central Command, Admiral William Fallon, who have direct responsibility for the conduct of military operations in the Middle East. The US. Air Force, the Secretary of Defense and Commander of Central Command, is now aware of what was likely going to be the true use of the B-52 and the responsibility of the Office of the Vice President. It is very likely that the exposure of the B-52 incident will lead to an indefinite hold on plans to attack Iran given uncertainty whether other nuclear weapons have been covertly positioned for use in the Middle East. Significantly, public officials briefed about the true circumstances of the B-52 incident will almost certainly place enormous pressure on Vice President Cheney to immediately resign if it is found that he played the role identified above. It is therefore anticipated that in a very short time, the public will learn that Cheney has resigned for health reasons.

The forthcoming September 14 Air Force report will likely describe the B-52 incident as an "error" and an "isolated incident" as foreshadowed in the September 6 Press Statement. This will create some difficulty in

exposing the actual role played by Cheney and any other government figures that supported him. There will be a need for continued public awareness of the true events behind the B-52 incident in order to expose the actual role of Cheney. Only in that way can Cheney be held accountable for his actions, and other government figures that supported his neo-conservative agenda be exposed. Regardless of whether Cheney's role as the prime architect of the B-52 incident is exposed to the public, the official backlash against his covert operation should force his resignation. In either case, a very dangerous public official would be removed from a powerful position of influence. More importantly, the world has been spared a devastating nuclear war by courageous American airmen who revealed the true contents of an otherwise routine B-52 landing at Barksdale, AFB headed for a covert nuclear mission to the Middle East.

Further Reading

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Kosovo, Macedonia, and Sri Lanka, and organized peacemaking initiatives involving mid to high level participants from these conflicts.

B-52 Bomber Incident & Insider Trading

B-52 Bomber Incident & Insider Trading – Was Someone Trying to Profit from a Nuclear Attack Against Iran Before Sept 21?
Go to Original.
See Also, Bin Laden Trades
By Michael Salla, Ph.D
September 10, 2007
A B-52 bomber loaded with five (increased to six in later reports) nuclear weapons fitted on the pylons under its wings was discovered after sitting for ten hours on a tarmac at Barksdale AFB on August 30. Three anonymous Air Force officers leaked the news of the incident to the Army Times newspaper which announced the discovery on September 5. The discovery immediately gained world wide coverage: (http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/09/marine_nuclear_B52_070904w/ . The mainstream news media has so far concentrated on the Air Force version of events that the incident was an 'error' and is now subject to an official investigation.
Barksdale AFB is a staging post for Middle East operations and routinely has B-52 flying missions. The B-52 incident has subsequently led to speculation that the nuclear weapons were intended for a covert mission to Iran, and the Office of the Vice President was probably involved in bypassing the normal chain of military command (see: http://tinyurl.com/2hbjk9). The discovery of the B-52 came on top of rapidly increasing speculation that the Bush administration is about to authorize a massive preemptive aerial assault against Iran. According to the Sunday Times, the Pentagon has prepared for air strikes against 1,200 targets in Iran that would in three days destroy Iran's military infrastructure (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article2369001.ece).
What gives reports of a planned attack against Iran involving nuclear weapons greater credibility is a number of mysterious August 2007 purchases of a particular type of stock called 'put options' and 'call options' which are based on a dramatic shift in the U.S. stock market (see: http://www.anomalicresearch.com/optioncall.html). Essentially, a "put option" is where an investor speculates that the market will drop dramatically, say 30-50%, whereas a "call option" is where the investor

bets particular stocks will rise just as dramatically. If the stock fails to dramatically shift either up or down by September 21, then the investors stands to lose much from their investment. Such an investment is very unusual and has many market analysts puzzled as to why anonymous investors would risk such large sums unless they had insider information. A similar stock market event happened in the weeks before 911 when anonymous investors made great profits when they successfully 'predicted' a dramatic drop in airline and insurances stocks, while also 'predicting' dramatic increases in stocks of corporations producing military armaments stocks (see: http://911research.wtc7.net/sept11/stockputs.html). The investments were so suspicious that they became subject to an insider trading investigation by U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) but the no one was ever identified or charged. This was despite a determined effort by the SEC to find who was behind the investments.

The parallels with 'put" and "call option" purchases just before 911 has led to speculation that the August billion dollar investments are based on insider knowledge of another 911 event before September 21. This led to predictions of a catastrophic event about to occur in the U.S. Another explanation for a dramatic shift in the stock market is that China will desert the US currency leading to a collapse in the US dollar. Both explanations would essentially lead to a collapse in some U.S. stocks, while other stocks would rise.

A more plausible explanation for the mysterious billion dollar investments is that anonymous investors had insider knowledge that an attack against Iran would occur before September 21, and this would involve nuclear weapons. If an aerial attack occurred along the scale described by the Sunday Times report and involved nukes, then the U.S. stock market would collapse as oil prices escalated dramatically. This would spark a global recession, and cause great hardship to many Americans who would find their investments and jobs at risk.

The nuclear armed B-52 was likely to be used in a covert mission in or near Iran. This mission would either have been secretly integrated into an aerial attack against Iran's military infrastructure, or used in a False Flag operation that would have justified a U.S. assault on Iran. Admiral William Fallon, Commander of U.S. Central Command, was to direct conventional bombing operations against Iran’s military infrastructure. The covert mission, however, would have had a different chain of command, where the Office of the Vice President was to take a prominent role. The nuclear weapons on the B-52 had adjustable yields between five and 150 kilotons which would have made them suitable in taking out Iran’s deep underground nuclear facilities. The effect of tactical nuclear weapons to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities would have been devastating. Radioactive

contamination would have dispersed widely affecting the health of millions in the region. At the same time, Iran's military and much of its civilian infrastructure would be destroyed by conventional munitions. This would have restricted Iran's abilities to cope with the health and humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons, and destruction of its nuclear facilities.

One question to be asked is ‘who are the hidden investors with insider knowledge that stood to gain billions in short term profits from a possible attack against Iran’? This answer will give an important clue to the long term agenda being played out, and the principal actors involved. In the case of 911, similar investors were able to evade detection from an official investigation by the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC launched an unprecedented investigation that deputized "hundreds, if not thousands, of key players in the private sector" (see: http://911research.wtc7.net/sept11/stockputs.html). According to former Los Angeles Police Officer, Michael Ruppert, what happens when individuals are deputized is that they are sworn to secrecy on national security grounds. This was a very effective way of keeping secret what was discovered in the SEC investigation. What is the most plausible explanation for the kind of investor that would have the power to subvert an SEC investigation in this manner? The most likely answer is the Central Intelligence Agency.

CIA front companies annually supply funds for a black budget used to fund covert national security projects . The black budget has been estimated to range between 1.1 to 1.7 trillion dollars annually which is funneled through the CIA to various military-corporate entities fulfilling such projects (see: http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0401/S00151.htm). The massive size of the black budget is needed to fund a ‘second’ Manhattan Project. Projects so deeply compartmentalized and classified, that most members of Congress are not informed of their existence.

The CIA is uniquely suited to perform this function of secretly raising revenue through the 1949 CIA Act which authorizes the CIA to expend funds "without regard to any provisions of law” (50USC 15:1.403f.a.1.). The CIA therefore does not have to follow any legal requirements for the funds it procures from various sources, and funnels to military-corporate entities directly responsible for the second Manhattan project.

The discovery of the nuclear armed B-52 is likely to lead to an indefinite delay in plans for a preemptive military attack against Iran. There is nevertheless a need to expose the principle actors and the underlying agendas of those behind the covert plans to use nuclear weapons. It is also important to expose anonymous investors that intended to profit from such an attack before September 21, and had insider knowledge of this.

President Eisenhower warned that an informed public is the best

safeguard against unwarranted abuses of executive power. The preemptive attack against Iran that does not have the support of the American people or Congress, would qualify for such an abuse.
The period leading up to September 21, 2007 was to witness a preemptive attack against Iran, involving nuclear weapons loaded on at least one B-52 bomber. The humanitarian cost in terms of radioactive fallout, and casualties from the destruction of Iran's military and much of its civilian infrastructure would have been catastrophic for the Persian Gulf region. Furthermore, the U.S. and global economy would have gone into a deep free fall in the event of dramatic increases in oil prices and further instability in the Middle East. Out of this planned tragedy, anonymous investors with possible CIA connections and insider knowledge, planned to profit. These funds ways would have been used to secretly fund a second Manhattan Project that piggy backed an aggressive neo-conservative agenda in Iran. The discovery of the nuclear armed B-52 has averted such a tragedy for the moment. Now is the time to make accountable all responsible for this frustrated plan.

This was No Accident - Nuclear Weapons are Different

This was No Accident: Nuclear Weapons are Different
By Dave Lindorff
Sept. 10, 2007
Go to Original.
Nobody should fall for a story that those six (yeah, it was first reported as five, but now the original military whistleblowers have told Army Times [0] it was six) nuclear-tipped cruise missiles that were flown in launch position on a B-52 from Minot, ND to Barksdale, LA, were put on there inadvertently.
I had some experience with the way nuclear weapons get handled, as compared to conventional weapons, and I can assure you that there is no way anyone would just "accidentally" pick up the wrong weapons.
Back in 1978, I was working as an investigative producer/reporter for the news program "28-Tonight" at KCET-TV in Los Angeles. I got word from some anti-nuke/peace organization that there were nuclear weapons being stored at the Seal Beach Naval Station south of Los Angeles. There was concern about this on two counts: first of all, it was a very densely populated urban area, and second, the weapons were allegedly being stored under the flight path of a busy civil airport, where a crash could easily happen.

Together with a cameraperson, I went down to the base. It was bisected by a highway. On either side of that two-lane road were big mesh wire fences. On the south side of the road, the fences were older, and topped with ordinary barbed wire. On the north side, there was a higher, new looking fence topped with coiled razor wire. There was then an interval of bare soil beyond which was a second fence, also topped with razor wire. Clearly, the security on the north side of the road was much greater.
Beyond the south fence were the weapons bunkers--long high mounds of earth, covered with parched sod. Each was perhaps 75 feet long, and 15 feet high. There was a concrete doorframe in the middle of each with an old iron door in the middle. No one was visible anywhere.
On the north side, however, where there were similar bunkers, but these mounds were bigger--perhaps 20 feet high and much longer. The piled up earth looked newer, and the entrances were much more solid looking. As well, the door to each had an armed guard standing in front of it. Clearly whatever was being stored in the bunkers on the north side of the street were much more important than those on the south side.
We stopped our car and got out, and the photographer started snapping still photos of the scene.
Immediately there was commotion inside the compound. Within less than a minute, a jeep came roaring towards us, filled with marines who were armed to the teeth. Guns drawn they ordered us, from behind the fence, to stop photographing and to stand where we were. Moments later there were sirens, and more armed jeeps came towards us from both directions down the road. We were quickly surrounded by armed marines who asked us what we were doing.
We told them we were investigating the nuclear weapons storage at the base.
They told us we had to go to the base headquarters, and took the camera. (The photographer, a pro at this stuff, had already snapped a role and stashed it in her pocket, so when they later took out and exposed the roll of film in the camera, we still had our visual evidence).
At base headquarters, the commander grilled us. Our station was called, and after it was confirmed that we were indeed journalists, they took the film, chastised us for bothering them, and, refusing to comment on whether or not there were nukes on the base, sent us on our way.
My point in recounting this experience is to note that nuclear weapons and warheads are not stored together with conventional weapons. They are also guarded much more tightly than are conventional weapons. There is simply no way that a ground crew could accidentally stroll into a weapons storage center and pick up the wrong missiles. (There's good reason for this, too, even aside from security issues: nuclear weapons have fail-safe triggers, and are not prone to just exploding on their own,

but conventional weapons are different. They can and often do go off by accident, and if one were stored amidst nuclear weapons and this happened, it could shatter the nuke and spread dangerous nuclear material all over the place. As a result, whether at Seal Beach Naval Station or at Minot AFB, nuclear weapons are strictly segregated from other weapons materials.)

It's clear that so far, no one in Congress or in the corporate media is asking the hard questions about this very disturbing incident.

I would say that the chances that those Advanced Cruise Missiles and their W80-1 nuclear warheads were loaded accidentally on that B-52 are exactly zero. So the question is: who ordered this flight, and why?

Until we have answers to those questions, we have to assume the worst--that this was deliberate, and thus sinister in the extreme--not the best.

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About author Dave Lindorff is the author of Killing Time: an Investigation into the Death Row Case of Mumia Abu-Jamal [1]. His new book of columns titled "This Can't be Happening! [2]" is published by Common Courage Press. Lindorff's new book is "The Case for Impeachment [3]," co-authored by Barbara Olshansky. He can be reached at: dlindorff@yahoo.com [4]

The Mystery of Minot: Loose nukes and a cluster of dead airmen raise troubling questions

by Dave Lindorff

Global Research, November 25, 2007
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7441

The unauthorized Aug. 29/30 cross-country flight of a B-52H Stratofortress armed with six nuclear-tipped AGM-29 Advanced Cruise missiles, which saw these 150-kiloton warheads go missing for 36 hours, has all the elements of two Hollywood movies. One would be a thriller about the theft from an armed weapons bunker of six nukes for some dark and murky purpose. The lead might be played by Matt Damon. The other movie would be a slapstick comedy about a bunch of bozos who couldnâ€™t tell the difference between a nuclear weapon and a pile of dummy warheads. The lead might be played by Adam Sandler, backed by the cast of "Police Academy III."

So far, the Pentagon, which has launched two separate investigations into the incident, seems to be assuming that it is dealing with the comedy

version, saying that some incredible "mistake" led to nuclear weapons being taken inadvertently from a weapons-storage bunker, loaded into launch position on a bomber, and flown from North Dakota to Louisiana. To date, more than a month after the incident, Pentagon investigators have completely ignored a peculiar cluster of six deaths, during the weeks immediately preceding and following the flight, of personnel at the two Air Force bases involved in the incident and at Air Force Commando Operations headquarters.

The operative assumption of the investigations appears to be that an Air Force decision to store nuclear, conventional, and dummy warheads in the same bunker and one mistake by weapons handlers initiated a chain of errors and oversights that led to the flight.

On Sept. 23, the Washington Post, in a story based upon interviews with military officials, many of them unidentified, suggested that the first known case of nuclear warheads leaving a weapons-storage area improperly was the result of two mistakes. The first, the article suggested, was a decision by the Air Force to permit the storing of nuclear weapons in the same highly secure and constantly guarded sod-covered bunkers -- known as "igloos" -- as non-nuclear weapons and dummy warheads (something that had never been allowed in the past).

The second was some as yet unidentified mistake by weapons handlers at Minot to mount six nuclear warheads onto six of the 12 Advanced Cruise Missiles that had been slated to be flown to Barksdale AFB for destruction. Those missiles and the six others, part of a group of 400 such missiles declared obsolete and slated for retirement and disassembly, should have been fitted with dummy warheads also. The Post article quotes military sources as saying that once the mistake was made, a cascade of errors followed as weapons handlers, ground crews, and the B-52 crew skipped all nuclear protocols, assuming they were dealing with dummy warheads.

The problem with this theory is that dummy warheads don't look the same as the real thing. The real warheads, called W80-1's, are shiny silver, a color which is clearly visible through postage-stamp-sized windows on the nosecone covers that protect them on the missiles. In addition, the mounted warheads are encased in a red covering as a second precaution.

Apparently the nukes (which can be set to explode at between 5 kilotons and 150 kilotons) were easily spotted by a Barksdale AFB ground crew when they went out to the plane on the tarmac hours after it landed. If the Barksdale ground crew, which had absolutely no reason to suspect it was looking at nuclear-tipped missiles, easily spotted the "error," why did everyone at Minot miss it, as claimed?

Clearly, whoever loaded the six nukes on one B-52 wing pylon, and whoever mounted that unit on the wing, knew or should have known that they were dealing with nukes -- and absent an order from the highest authority in Washington, loading such nukes on a bomber was against all policy. The odds of randomly putting six nukes all on one pylon, and six dummies on the other, are 1:924. And how curious that the pilot, who is supposed to check all 12 missiles before flying, checked only the pylon containing the dummy warheads.

Various experts familiar with nuclear-weapons-handling protocols express astonishment at what happened on Aug. 29 and 30. After all, over the course of more than six decades, the protocols for handling nuclear arms have called for at least two people at every step, with paper trails, bar codes, and real-time computer tracking of every warhead in the arsenal. Nothing like this has been known to have happened before. Air Force Gen. Eugene Habiger, who served as US Strategic Command chief from 1996 to 1998, told the Post, "I a have been in the nuclear business since 1966 and am not aware of any incident more disturbing." Philip Coyle, a senior advisor at the Center for Defense Information who served as assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, calls the incident "astonishing" and "unbelievable." He says, "This wasn't just a mistake. I've counted, and at least 20 things had to have gone wrong for this to have occurred."

Bruce Blair, a former Air Force nuclear launch officer who is now president of the World Security Institute, says that the explanation of the incident as laid out in the Washington Post, and in the limited statements from the Air Force and Department of Defense, which call it a "mistake," are "incomplete." He notes that no mention has been made as to whether the nukes in question, which had been pre-mounted on a pylon for attachment to the B-52 wing, had their PAL (permission action link) codes unlocked to make them operational, or whether a system on board the plane that would ordinarily prevent an unauthorized launch had been activated. "For all we know, these missiles could have been fully operational," he says.

The Air Force and Department of Defense are refusing to answer any questions about such matters.

Meanwhile, there are those six deaths. On July 20, 1st Lt. Weston Kissel, a 28-year-old B-52 pilot from Minot, died in a motorcycle accident while on home leave in Tennessee.

Another Minot B-52 pilot, 20-year-old Adam Barrs, died on July 5 in Minot when a car he was riding in, driven by another Minot airman, Stephen Garrett, went off the road, hit a tree, and caught fire. Airman Garrett was brought to the hospital in critical condition and has since been charged with negligent homicide.

Two more Air Force personnel, Senior Airman Clint Huff, 29, of Barksdale AFB, and his wife Linda died on Sept. 15 in nearby Shreveport, Louisiana, when Huff reportedly attempted to pass a van in a no-passing zone on his motorcycle, and the van made a left-hand turn, striking them.
Then there are two reported suicides, which both occurred within days of the flight. One involved Todd Blue, a 20-year-old airman who was in a unit that guarded weapons at Minot. He reportedly shot himself in the head on Sept. 11 while on a visit to his family in Wytheville, Virginia. Local police investigators termed his death a suicide.
The second suicide, on Aug. 30, was John Frueh, a special forces weather commando at the Air Force's Special Operations command headquartered at Hurlburt AFB in Florida. Hurlburt's website says, "Every night, as millions of Americans sleep peacefully under the blanket of freedom," Air Force Special Operations commandos work "in deep dark places, far away from home, risking their lives to keep that blanket safe." Frueh, 33, a married father of two who had just received approval for promotion from captain to major, reportedly flew from Florida to Portland, Oregon, for a friend's wedding. He never showed up. Instead, he called on Aug. 29, the day the missiles were loaded, from an interstate pull-off just outside Portland to say he was going for a hike in a park nearby. (It is not clear why he was at a highway rest stop as he had no car.) A day later, back in Portland, he rented a car at the airport, again calling his family. After he failed to appear at the wedding, his family filed a missing person's report with the Portland police. The Sheriff's Department in remote Skamania County, Washington, found Frueh's rental car ten days later on the side of a road nearly 120 miles from the airport in a remote area of Badger Peak. Search dogs found his body in the woods. His death was ruled a suicide, though neither the sheriff's investigator nor the medical examiner would give details. What makes this alleged suicide odd, however, is that the sheriff reports that Frueh had with him a knapsack containing a GPS locator and a videocam -- odd equipment for someone intent on ending his life.
Of course, it could be that all six of these deaths are coincidences -- all just accidents and personal tragedies. But when they occur around the time six nuclear-tipped missiles go missing in a bizarre incident, the likes of which the Pentagon hasn't seen before, one would think investigators would be on those cases like vultures on carrion. In fact, police and medical examiners in the Frueh and Blue cases say no federal investigators, whether from DOD or FBI, have called them. Worse still, because the B-52 incident got so little media attention -- no coverage in most local news -- none of those investigating the accidents and suicides even knew about it or about the other deaths.

"It would have been interesting to know all that when I was examining Mr. Blue's body," says Virginia coroner Mike Stoker, "but no one told me about any of it or asked me about him."
"If we had known that several people had died under questionable circumstances, it might have affected how we'd look at a body,â€☐ says Don Phillips, the sheriff's deputy in Washington State who investigated the Frueh death. "But nobody from the federal government has ever contacted us about this."
"Certainly, in a case like this, the suicides should be a red flag," says Hans Kristensen, a nuclear-affairs expert with the Federation of American Scientists. "It's wild speculation to think that there might be some connection between the deaths and the incident, but it certainly should be investigated."
Award-winning investigative reporter Dave Lindorff has been working as a journalist for 33 years. A regular columnist for CounterPunch (www.counterpunch.org), he also writes frequently for Extra! (www.fair.org) and Salon magazine (www.salon.com), as well as for Businessweek, The Nation and Treasury & Risk Management Magazine. In the late 1970s, he ran the Daily News bureau covering Los Angeles County government, and in the mid-'90s, spent several years as a correspondent in Hong Kong and China for Businessweek. Over the years he has written for such publications as Rolling Stone, Mother Jones, Village Voice, Forbes, The London Observer and the Australian National Times.
Dave Lindorff is a frequent contributor to Global Research. Global Research Articles by Dave Lindorff

US, NATO and Israel Deploy Nukes directed against Iran

by Michel Chossudovsky
Global Research, September 27, 2007
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www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=6918
In late August, reported by the Military Times, a US Air Force B-52 bomber flew from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana with six AGM advanced cruise missiles, each of which was armed with a W-80-1 nuclear warhead. "... Missiles were mounted on the pylons under its wings. Each of the warheads carried a

yield of up to 150 kilotons, more than ten times as powerful as the US bomb that leveled Hiroshima at the close of the Second World War." (See Bill Van Auken, Global Research September 2007)

The Military Times byline was "B-52 mistakenly flies with nukes aboard". The issue was casually acknowledged by The Washington Post and the New York Times. The reports quoted a US Air force spokesman. The matter was offhandedly brushed aside. The incident represented “an isolated mistake” and that “at no time was there a threat to public safety.” (Ibid) :

"As far as is known, the incident marked the first time that a US plane has taken off armed with nuclear weapons in nearly 40 years. ...

... The transport of weapons from one base to another, however, is normally carried out in the holds of C-17 and C-130 cargo planes, not fixed to the wings of combat bombers.

Someone had to give the order to mount the missiles on the plane. The question is whether it was a local Air Force commander—either by mistake or deliberately—or whether the order came from higher up.

B-52s from Barksdale have been used repeatedly to strike targets in Iraq, firing cruise missiles at Iraqi targets in 1996 and 1998, and in the “shock and awe” campaign that preceded the 2003 invasion, carrying out some 150 bombing runs that devastated much of the southern half of the country.

Moreover, the weapon that was fixed to the wings of the B-52 flying from Minot air base was designed for use against hardened targets, such as underground bunkers.

Given the ratcheting up of the threats against Iran and the previous reports of plans for the use of “tactical” nuclear weapons against Iranian nuclear installations, there is a very real possibility that the flight to Barksdale was part of covert preparations for a nuclear strike against Iran.

If this is indeed the case, the claims about a “mistake” by a munitions officer and a few airmen in North Dakota may well be merely a cover story aimed at concealing the fact that the government in Washington is preparing a criminal act of world historic proportions by ordering—without provocation—the first use of nuclear weapons since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki more than sixty years ago. (Bill van Auken, op. cit).

(The rest is a must read. Please go to http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=6918 for the full article.)

B-52 Nukes Headed for Iran, Not For Decommissioning: Airforce Refused

-- SPECIAL REPORT --

Air Force refused to fly weapons to Middle East theater

By Wayne Madsen

Sept. 24, 2007

Author's website: http://www.waynemadsenreport.com

WMR has learned from U.S. and foreign intelligence sources that the B-52 transporting six stealth AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles, each armed with a W-80-1 nuclear warhead, on August 30, were destined for the Middle East via Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana.

However, elements of the Air Force, supported by U.S. intelligence agency personnel, successfully revealed the ultimate destination of the nuclear weapons and the mission was aborted due to internal opposition within the Air Force and U.S. Intelligence Community.

Yesterday, the Washington Post attempted to explain away the fact that America's nuclear command and control system broke down in an unprecedented manner by reporting that it was the result of "security failures at multiple levels." It is now apparent that the command and control breakdown, reported as a BENT SPEAR incident to the Secretary of Defense and White House, was not the result of a command and control chain-of-command "failures" but the result of a revolt and push back by various echelons within the Air Force and intelligence agencies against a planned U.S. attack on Iran using nuclear and conventional weapons.

The Washington Post story on BENT SPEAR may have actually been an effort in damage control by the Bush administration. WMR has been informed by a knowledgeable source that one of the six nuclear-armed cruise missiles was, and may still be, unaccounted for. In that case, the nuclear reporting incident would have gone far beyond BENT SPEAR to a National Command Authority alert known as EMPTY QUIVER, with the special classification of PINNACLE.

Just as this report was being prepared, Newsweek reported that Vice President Dick Cheney's recently-departed Middle East adviser, David Wurmser, told a small group of advisers some months ago that Cheney had considered asking Israel to launch a missile attack on the Iranian nuclear site at Natanz. Cheney reasoned that after an Iranian retaliatory strike, the United States would have ample reasons to launch its own

massive attack on Iran. However, plans for Israel to attack Iran directly were altered to an Israeli attack on a supposed Syrian-Iranian-North Korean nuclear installation in northern Syria.

WMR has learned that a U.S. attack on Iran using nuclear and conventional weapons was scheduled to coincide with Israel's September 6 air attack on a reputed Syrian nuclear facility in Dayr az-Zwar, near the village of Tal Abyad, in northern Syria, near the Turkish border. Israel's attack, code named OPERATION ORCHARD, was to provide a reason for the U.S. to strike Iran. The neo-conservative propaganda onslaught was to cite the cooperation of the George Bush's three remaining "Axis of Evil" states -- Syria, Iran, and North Korea -- to justify a sustained Israeli attack on Syria and a massive U.S. military attack on Iran.

WMR has learned from military sources on both sides of the Atlantic that there was a definite connection between Israel's OPERATION ORCHARD and BENT SPEAR involving the B-52 that flew the six nuclear-armed cruise missiles from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale. There is also a connection between these two events as the Pentagon's highly-classified PROJECT CHECKMATE, a compartmented U.S. Air Force program that has been working on an attack plan for Iran since June 2007, around the same time that Cheney was working on the joint Israeli-U.S. attack scenario on Iran.

PROJECT CHECKMATE was leaked in an article by military analyst Eric Margolis in the Rupert Murdoch-owned newspaper, the /Times of London/, is a program that involves over two dozen Air Force officers and is headed by Brig. Gen. Lawrence Stutzriem and his chief civilian adviser, Dr. Lani Kass, a former Israeli military intelligence officer who, astoundingly, is now involved in planning a joint U.S.-Israeli massive military attack on Iran that involves a "decapitating" blow on Iran by hitting between three to four thousand targets in the country. Stutzriem and Kass report directly to the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael Moseley, who has also been charged with preparing a report on the B-52/nuclear weapons incident.

Kass' area of speciality is cyber-warfare, which includes ensuring "information blockades," such as that imposed by the Israeli government on the Israeli media regarding the Syrian air attack on the alleged Syrian "nuclear installation." British intelligence sources have reported that the Israeli attack on Syria was a "true flag" attack originally designed to foreshadow a U.S. attack on Iran. After the U.S. Air Force push back against transporting the six cruise nuclear-armed AGM-129s to the Middle East, Israel went ahead with its attack on Syria in order to help ratchet up tensions between Washington on one side and Damascus, Tehran, and Pyongyang on the other.

The other part of CHECKMATE's brief is to ensure that a media "perception management" is waged against Syria, Iran, and North Korea. This involves articles such as that which appeared with Joby Warrick's and Walter Pincus' bylines in yesterdays /Washington Post/. The article, titled "The Saga of a Bent Spear," quotes a number of seasoned Air Force nuclear weapons experts as saying that such an incident is unprecedented in the history of the Air Force. For example, Retired Air Force General Eugene Habiger, the former chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, said he has been in the "nuclear business" since 1966 and has never been aware of an incident "more disturbing."

Command and control breakdowns involving U.S. nuclear weapons are unprecedented, except for that fact that the U.S. military is now waging an internal war against neo-cons who are embedded in the U.S. government and military chain of command who are intent on using nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive war with Iran.

CHECKMATE and OPERATION ORCHARD would have provided the cover for a pre-emptive U.S. and Israeli attack on Iran had it not been for BENT SPEAR involving the B-52. In on the plan to launch a pre-emptive attack on Iran involving nuclear weapons were, according to our sources, Cheney, National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley; members of the CHECKMATE team at the Pentagon, who have close connections to Israeli intelligence and pro-Israeli think tanks in Washington, including the Hudson Institute; British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, a political adviser to Tony Blair prior to becoming a Member of Parliament; Israeli political leaders like Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu; and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, who did his part last week to ratchet up tensions with Iran by suggesting that war with Iran was a probability. Kouchner retracted his statement after the U.S. plans for Iran were delayed.

Although the Air Force tried to keep the B-52 nuclear incident from the media, anonymous Air Force personnel leaked the story to /Military Times/ on September 5, the day before the Israelis attacked the alleged nuclear installation in Syria and the day planned for the simultaneous U.S. attack on Iran. The leaking of classified information on U.S. nuclear weapons disposition or movement to the media, is, itself, unprecedented. Air Force regulations require the sending of classified BEELINE reports to higher Air Force authorities on the disclosure of classified Air Force information to the media.

In another highly unusual move, Defense Secretary Robert Gates has asked an outside inquiry board to look into BENT SPEAR, even before the Air Force has completed its own investigation, a virtual vote of no confidence in the official investigation being conducted by Major General

Douglas Raaberg, chief of air and space operations at the Air Combat Command.

Gates asked former Air Force Chief of Staff, retired General Larry Welch, to lead a Defense Science Board task force that will also look into the BENT SPEAR incident. The official Air Force investigation has reportedly been delayed for unknown reasons. Welch is President and CEO of the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), a federally-funded research contractor that operates three research centers, including one for Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President and another for the National Security Agency. One of the board members of IDA is Dr. Suzanne H. Woolsey of the Paladin Capital Group and wife of former CIA director and arch-neocon James Woolsey.

WMR has learned that neither the upper echelons of the State Department nor the British Foreign Office were privy to OPERATION ORCHARD, although Hadley briefed President Bush on Israeli spy satellite intelligence that showed the Syrian installation was a joint nuclear facility built with North Korean and Iranian assistance. However, it is puzzling why Hadley would rely on Israeli imagery intelligence (IMINT) from its OFEK (Horizon) 7 satellite when considering that U.S. IMINT satellites have greater capabilities.

The Air Force's "information warfare" campaign against media reports on CHECKMATE and OPERATION ORCHARD also affected international reporting of the recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution asking Israel to place its nuclear weapons program under IAEA controls, similar to those that the United States wants imposed on Iran and North Korea. The resolution also called for a nuclear-free zone throughout the Middle East. The IAEA's resolution, titled "Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East," was passed by the 144-member IAEA General Meeting on September 20 by a vote of 53 to 2, with 47 abstentions. The only two countries to vote against were Israel and the United States. However, the story carried from the IAEA meeting in Vienna by Reuters, the Associated Press, and Agence France Press, was that it was Arab and Islamic nations that voted for the resolution. This was yet more perception management carried out by CHECKMATE, the White House, and their allies in Europe and Israel with the connivance of the media. In fact, among the 53 nations that voted for the resolution were China, Russia, India, Ireland, and Japan. The 47 abstentions were described as votes "against" the resolution even though an abstention is neither a vote for nor against a measure. America's close allies, including Britain, France, Australia, Canada, and Georgia, all abstained.

Suspiciously, the IAEA carried only a brief item on the resolution concerning Israel's nuclear program and a roll call vote was not available either at the IAEA's web site -- www.iaea.org -- or in the media.

The perception management campaign by the neocon operational cells in the Bush administration, Israel and Europe was designed to keep a focus on Iran's nuclear program, not on Israel's. Any international examination of Israel's nuclear weapons program would likely bring up Israeli nuclear scientist Mordechai Vanunu, a covert from Judaism to Christianity, who was kidnapped in Rome by a Mossad "honey trap" named Cheryl Bentov (aka, Cindy) and a Mossad team in 1986 and held against his will in Israel ever since.

Vanunu's knowledge of the Israeli nuclear weapons program would focus on the country's own role in nuclear proliferation, including its program to share nuclear weapons technology with apartheid South Africa and Taiwan in the late 1970s and 1980s. The role of Ronald Reagan's Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Ken Adelman in Israeli's nuclear proliferation during the time frame 1983-1987 would also come under scrutiny. Adelman, a member of the Reagan-Bush transition State Department team from November 1980 to January 1981, voiced his understanding for the nuclear weapons programs of Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan in a June 28, 1981 /New York Times/ article titled, "3 Nations Widening Nuclear Contacts." The journalist who wrote the article was Judith Miller. Adelman felt that the three countries wanted nuclear weapons because of their ostracism from the West, the third world, and the hostility from the Communist countries. Of course, today, the same argument can be used by Iran, North Korea, and other "Axis of Evil" nations so designated by the neocons in the Bush administration and other governments.

There are also news reports that suggest an intelligence relationship between Israel and North Korea. On July 21, 2004, New Zealand's /Dominion Post/ reported that three Mossad agents were involved in espionage in New Zealand. Two of the Mossad agents, Uriel Kelman and Elisha Cara (aka Kra), were arrested and imprisoned by New Zealand police (an Israeli diplomat in Canberra, Amir Lati, was expelled by Australia and New Zealand intelligence identified a fourth Mossad agent involved in the New Zealand espionage operation in Singapore). The third Mossad agent in New Zealand, Zev William Barkan (aka Lev Bruckenstein), fled New Zealand -- for North Korea.

New Zealand Foreign Minister Phil Goff revealed that Barkan, a former Israeli Navy diver, had previously worked at the Israeli embassy in Vienna, which is also the headquarters of the IAEA. He was cited by the /Sydney Morning Herald/ as trafficking in passports stolen from foreign tourists in Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. New

Zealand's One News reported that Barkan was in North Korea to help the nation build a wall to keep its citizens from leaving.
The nuclear brinkmanship involving the United States and Israel and the breakdown in America's command and control systems have every major capital around the world wondering about the Bush administration's true intentions.
NOTE: WMR understands the risks to informed individuals in reporting the events of August 29/30, to the present time, that concern the discord within the U.S. Air Force, U.S. intelligence agencies, and other military services. Any source with relevant information and who wishes to contact us anonymously may drop off sealed correspondence at or send mail via the Postal Service to: Wayne Madsen, c/o The Front Desk, National Press Club, 13th Floor, 529 14th St., NW, Washington, DC, 20045.

Deadly Missiles: Not as sexy as Britney

James Clay Fuller
Sept. 17, 2007
Go to Original.
Have we ever before seen a major news event disappear from public view so completely and so quickly? Or a story with such potential significance so widely ignored and minimized?
And what do we make of that?
I'm talking about the supposedly mistaken transport of either five or six missiles carrying nuclear warheads from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana on Aug. 30. The Air Force said the warheads were being shipped for “decommissioning.”
The basic facts were reported by writer Michael Hoffman in an article Sept. 5 in the Army Times and Military Times:
A B-52 bomber “mistakenly” loaded with five nuclear warheads (later reported as six) flew from Minot to Barksdale. The nuclear warheads “should have been removed in Minot before being transported to Barksdale” according to three Air Force officers who tipped the reporter. They also said the missiles carrying the nukes were mounted on pylons on the bomber's wings – as are missiles which are to be fired.
Hoffman said the officers who gave him the facts asked not to be identified “because they were not authorized to discuss the incident.”
In fact, of course, no one was so authorized. The three officers appear to have acted as whistle blowers.

After Hoffman's report was published, USA Today and one or two other publications picked it up, and then over a few days, most large newspapers published a truncated version of the story – only a few paragraphs in most cases.

The Air Force, which generally stonewalls on such stories, quickly admitted that the nuclear weapons had been improperly transported and maintained that “the transfer was safely conducted and the weapons were in Air Force custody and control at all times.”

That quickness was surprising, given the service's history when caught in other mistakes, and has caused some observers to speculate that some high-level Air Force brass was happy that the story reached the public – perhaps because there was evil afoot that was blocked by the publicity.

Hoffman quoted Steve Fetter, a former Defense Department official who used to work on nuclear weapons policy, and Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, about the possibilities of nuclear detonation, radiation or plutonium leaks and the possibility of the warheads being swiped by terrorists or “rogue nations.” No danger of detonation or leaks, the experts said, and the risk of bad guys getting the nukes was “minimal.”

Did that reassurance cause you to go, “Whew!” and decide that all is well?

Me either.

Of course an investigation, led by Maj. Gen. Douglas Raaberg, director of Air and Space Operations at Air Combat Command Headquarters, was launched immediately “to find the cause of the mistake” and “figure out how it could have been prevented.”

Having been given such gasbag assurances, the country's corporate news outfits dropped the story as they would a road apple accidentally picked up when reaching for a dropped wallet. If you listened carefully at the right moment, you could probably have heard the collective murmur of “Thank God that's over” and the following happy shouts of “What's Britney up to?”

Never have so many inadequate journalists asked so few questions about an incident carrying so many possible national and world-wide implications.

Fortunately, some very bright bloggers and good reporters for on-line news operations have been asking the right questions, although they're not getting anything like adequate answers, and they reach only a tiny percentage of the population.

Here are some facts your local newspaper almost certainly didn't give you, and the major unanswered questions:

* Were five missiles with nuclear warheads transported to the Louisiana air base, or were there six? Hoffman originally said five, but later Air

Force statements indicated it was six. Amid the stammering and stuttering, it came to appear that six nuclear missiles left the storage area in North Dakota, but only five arrived in Louisiana. I have been unable to find any resolution or explanation of that difference. The possibilities, if a nuclear warhead is missing, are numerous and in all cases terrible.

* Why were the missiles transported on bombers? There have been standing orders for 40 (forty) years against such flights over U.S. soil. The procedures, therefore, are pretty well established. They were instituted after several accidents in which nuclear bombs or rockets were dropped or involved in crashes. Standard procedure for many years has been to separate the warheads from missiles, disarm the warheads and only then move them on specially fitted transport planes. The transports are rigged to prevent, or at least minimize, radiation leaks in event of a crash.

Nuclear weapons are never to be transported while attached to missiles or on combat planes unless they are to be used in war. All movement of nuclear weapons must be approved by the commanding generals of major service commands, who must “authorize and approve transport modes and movement routes for nuclear weapons in their custody,” according to an article by Chuck Simpson on Rense.com.

* The Air Force said the warheads were being transported for “decommissioning.” If true, why were they flown to Barksdale in Louisiana, which is -- incidentally, of course -- a staging base for B-52s being sent to the Middle East? Several writers said that warheads to be disassembled normally are sent to Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico, or to a base at Tucson, Arizona. They are within easy ground transport range of the the Pantex plant outside of Amarillo, Texas, where nuclear weapons are “decommissioned.”

* Some people familiar with the handling of nuclear weapons have said flatly that a mistake of the type claimed by the Air Force is not possible. Here's why:

--There is a carefully designed computer tracking system for nuclear weapons.

--Several ranking individuals must sign approvals before such weapons can be removed from
their storage bunkers.

--Nuclear warheads carry distinctive red warning markings, which are entirely different from the immediately recognizable markings on non-nuclear practice warheads.

--Nuclear weapons are transported from storage bunkers to aircraft in caravans with guards armed with machine guns and rifles. At least two people, constantly within sight of each other, jointly control every step of the process, from removal from storage bunkers to loading on aircraft.

--In storage, nuclear weapons are connected to what are described as “sophisticated” alarm systems to prevent removal or tampering. Only a high ranking officer can order the alarm system to be turned off, which is necessary before weapons are removed from storage.

In sum, say those who've been part of the process, loading nuclear weapons into combat position on an aircraft by mistake simply isn't possible. The implication is that someone of sufficient rank authorized the loading of those missiles on the bomber.

Several angry bloggers suggested that Vice President Dick Cheney, whose “back door” chain of command over portions of the military has been widely reported, authorized the transport of the nuclear missiles.

One who mentioned that possibility was Dave Lindorff, an investigative reporter and author, co-writer with Barbara Olshansky of the recent book “The Case for Impeachment: The Legal Argument for Removing President George W. Bush from
Office.”

Such writers also noted that Cheney is the leading advocate for bombing Iran in the White House debate on that issue, and that some, if not all, among his coterie of neocons favor a nuclear attack, as reported even in some of the big corporate newspapers.

I also have seen some speculations about false-flag provocations, quite logically reasoned, but we won't go into that now.

Of course, any suggestion of vice presidential misconduct, or anything you or I might come up with as an explanation for the gaping holes in the official story, would amount to a conspiracy theory. And the uttering of the term “conspiracy theory” by anybody at all – general or janitor -- means in this country that the subject can no longer be mentioned except in ridicule.

Still, I can't help thinking it would be good if we had real, functioning news organizations in this country, as we once did. Back then, questions were asked when the official lies and cover-ups became obvious, and genuine answers were discovered with surprising frequency.

Someone may have stolen a nuke? Someone got around all of the safeguards in order to transport nuclear missiles in illegal fashion for unknown purpose? Congress could investigate and, if it demanded them, get to honest answers, but don't hold your breath.

Oh, well. Have you heard the latest about O.J. Simpson and the jewelry heist?

Former B-52 fleet commander leading probe of nuclear missile incident

Former B-52 fleet commander leading probe of nuclear missile incident
September 20, 2007
Go to Original.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has asked a retired general who once commanded the nation's fleet of B-52s to lead an outside inquiry into how one of the bombers was mistakenly armed with nuclear weapons at a base in North Dakota and flown to Barksdale Air Force Base.
The Air Force began investigating the episode three weeks ago but Gates wants an outside inquiry, led by former Air Force Chief of Staff Larry Welch.
The nuclear-tipped cruise missiles were mounted under a B-52's wings and flown across the country from Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale on Aug. 30. The bomber sat at Barksdale for 10 hours before crews noticed six of the missiles had nuclear warheads.
The Air Force said there was never any danger to the public.
A spokesman for Gates said he believes an "outside set of eyes" would help to "get a better sense of what went wrong." Welch will lead a Defense Science Board task force to determine whether the B-52 incident has wider implications for the military.
(The Associated Press contributed to this report)

Is USAF Stand Down To Find A Missing Nuke?

Someone, operating under a special chain of command within the United States Air Force, just stole a nuclear weapon.
By Chuck Simpson / AboveTopSecret.com
Sept. 12, 2007
Go to original.

> Six nuclear weapons disappeared from Minot AFB in North Dakota.

Five nuclear weapons were discovered at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana.

Which leads to my chilling conclusion: Someone, operating under a special chain of command within the United States Air Force, just stole a nuclear weapon.

What next? The answer has been provided several times, most recently by CIA Director and General Michael Hayden. On September 7, dressed in full military uniform, Hayden told assembled members of the Council of Foreign Relations: "Our analysts assess with high confidence that al-Qaida's central leadership is planning high-impact plots against the U. S. homeland."

"We assess with high confidence that al-Qaida is focusing on targets that would produce mass casualties, dramatic destruction and significant aftershocks." An eye for an eye. Use of nukes will justify use of nukes. A perfect excuse to wage nuclear war against Iran. I suspect Hayden is absolutely correct, except for his mistaken identification of the "central leadership" that is planning detonation of a nuclear weapon on American soil.

Some History

Barksdale Missile Number Six deserves far more public attention than it's received to date. Missile Number Six is potentially the major story of at least this year. Until 1968 under the Airborne Alert Program, informally called Operation Chrome Dome, the Air Force routinely kept about a dozen strategic bombers with nuclear weapons flying at all times.
One predictable result was crashes and incidents. In 1968 the Department of Defense published a list of 13 serious nuclear weapons accidents that occurred between 1950 and 1968. In 1980 the list was revised to include 32 incidents through that year. Notably, the Pentagon has not acknowledged any accidents since 1980. This alone highlights the importance the Pentagon is placing on the recent transportation of nuclear weapons from North Dakota to Louisiana.
Through 1968, several reported incidents involved plane crashes or malfunctions, beginning with the crash of a B-29 near Fairfield, California in August 1950. The resulting blast was felt 30 miles away. In July 1950 a B-50 crashed near Lebanon, Ohio. The high-explosive trigger for the nuclear weapon detonated on impact. The blast was felt over 25 miles away.

In May 1957 a nuclear weapon fell from the bomb bay of a B-36 near Albuquerque, New Mexico. Parachutes malfunctioned and the weapon was destroyed on impact. In October 1957 near Homestead, Florida a B-47 crashed. The nuclear weapon was burned. In March 1958 a B-47 accidentally dropped a nuclear weapon near Florence, South Carolina. The high-explosive trigger detonated on impact. In November 1958 a B-47 crashed near Abilene, Texas. The trigger of the nuclear weapon exploded upon impact. In July 1959 a C-124 crashed near Bossier City, Louisiana. Both plane and nuclear weapon were destroyed.

In October 1959 a B-52 with two nuclear weapons was involved in a mid-air collision near Hardinsburg, Kentucky. One weapon partially burned. In January 1961 a B-52 broke apart in mid-air near Goldsboro, North Carolina. Two nuclear weapons were released. The parachute on one weapon malfunctioned, and contamination was spread over a wide area. The uranium core was never recovered. Daniel Ellsberg reported that detonation was a very real risk because five of six safety devices failed. In that month near Monticello, Idaho a B-52 carrying nuclear weapons exploded in mid-air. No information was made available as to the weapons.

In March 1961 a B-52 with two nuclear weapons crashed near Yuba City, California. In January 1964 a B-52 carrying two nuclear weapons crashed near Cumberland, Maryland. In January 1966 a B-52 carrying four hydrogen bombs crashed after a mid-air collision near Palomares, Spain. Two weapons exploded on impact, with resulting plutonium contamination. A months-long program was undertaken to locate and extract the other two weapons from the ocean. Major policy changes were taken under consideration.

In January 1968 a B-52 carrying four hydrogen weapons crashed and burned near Thule AFB in Greenland. Explosives in one bomb detonated, spreading plutonium contamination. Apparently, the other three weapons have never been accounted for. Following large public protests Denmark, which owns Greenland and prohibits nuclear weapons on or over its territory, filed a strong protest. A few days later the Secretary of Defense ordered the removal of nuclear weapons from planes. After that order was issued, all aircraft armed with nuclear weapons were grounded but kept in a constant state of alert.

In 1991 by Presidential order, nuclear weapons were removed from all aircraft. Bomber nuclear ground alerts, during which nuclear weapons are loaded onto bombers during test and training exercises, were halted. After that time, all nuclear weapons to be delivered by plane were permanently maintained in secure storage facilities.

August 30, 2007

All of which makes the transport of nuclear weapons in combat position on a combat plane so newsworthy. On August 30, for the first time since 1968, nuclear warheads in combat position were carried by an American bomber. Numerous international treaty provisions were violated in the process. That Thursday, a B-52H Stratofortress flew from Minot AFB in North Dakota to Barksdale AFB in Louisiana while carrying twelve cruise missiles. Either five or six of those missiles were armed with nuclear warheads.

Cruise Missiles

The missiles on the B-52 were AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile units, specifically designed to be launched from wing pods of B-52H planes. A total of 460 units were manufactured by Raytheon. A total of 394 units are currently maintained by the Air Force. Apparently, 38 are to be modernized and upgraded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the other 356 are to be decommissioned pursuant to the 2002 Moscow treaty.

Raytheon has publicly announced the AGM-129 missiles are to be modified to accomplish a "classified cruise missile mission". This has widely been interpreted to mean conversion to bunker-busters, most likely for use in Iran. This widely accepted explanation is being used to explain why armed cruise missiles are being flown in American airspace.

Nuclear Warheads

The AGM-129 was specifically designed to deliver a W-80 nuclear warhead. The W-80 weapon has a variable yield capability, of 5 to 150 kilotons. For comparison purposes, the bomb used on Hiroshima was 13 to 15 kilotons, or equivalent to 13,000 to 15,000 tons of TNT explosive.

News Stories and Flawed Explanations

The story of the B-52 flight was first reported by Army Times, owned by Gannett, on Wednesday September 5. Gannett relied on information provided by "anonymous officers". The story was picked up by Yahoo Wednesday morning, published by USA Today and The Washington Pos, and then quickly spread.

In response, the Pentagon quickly spread an official explanation. The Air Force admitted to an inadvertent error: The intent was to transport ACMs without weapons. According to military officers, the nuclear warheads should have been removed before the missiles were mounted on the pylons under the wings of the bomber.

In the words of the Pentagon: "There was an error which occurred during a regularly scheduled transfer of weapons between two bases. The weapons were safe and remained in Air Force control and custody at all times." For almost the first time in the history of the nation, the military has publicly and promptly admitted it "made a mistake". This in itself is truly astounding.

To reinforce the military's claim that a mistake was made, a system-wide stand-down was ordered for September 14. That official explanation was quickly explained away. The mistake was made intentionally, so a "deliberate leak" of a secret operation could occur. The CIA and the Office of Counter-Terrorism in the State Department explained that Barksdale AFB is a "jumping off point" for re-supply of the Middle East. The "deliberate leak" was intended to serve as a veiled warning to Iran. This deliberately misleading explanation is evidently intended to lead the public or Iran or both to logically conclude the missiles are bound for Iran. Bluntly, State and the CIA converted a whistleblower leak by true American patriots into a deliberate leak by official Washington, to scare Iran.

By this means Washington has led the public to forget or overlook the real issue.

To begin, the multiple official explanations reek to high heaven. They collectively read suspiciously like flimsy cover stories concocted in hasty desperation. And no amount of pretty lipstick will be able to make the official explanations pretty.

Transportation Violations

More conflicting explanations followed. These missiles are part of a group scheduled to be decommissioned. This would explain why they were shipped out of North Dakota. But the missiles were not transported on their way to decommissioning. Missiles are normally decommissioned at Davis-Monthan AFB at Tucson. Nuclear weapons are decommissioned at the Department of Energy's Pantex facility near Amarillo, Texas, accessed through Kirkland AFB in New Mexico.

And military policy requires minimization of the number of flights made with nuclear weapons aboard. So the weapons should not have been mounted on the missiles, flown to Louisiana, un-mounted and flown to New Mexico.

The mode of transportation is also a major issue not defused by official explanations. Per standard operating procedures, or SOPs, both missiles and nuclear warheads are transported primarily by air, in specially modified C-130s or C-17s. Under no peacetime circumstances do military SOPs allow transport of nuclear weapons mounted in cruise missiles mounted in combat positions on combat planes.

Department of Defense Directive Number 4540.5, issued on February 4, 1998, regulates logistic transportation of nuclear weapons. By delegation of Commanders of Combatant Commands, movement of nuclear weapons must be approved by commanders of major service commands. Commanders of Combat Commands or service component commanders must evaluate, authorize and approve transport modes and movement routes for nuclear weapons in their custody. The Air Force is required to

maintain a Prime Nuclear Airlift Force capability to conduct the logistic transport of nuclear weapons.
Under SOPs, combat planes with combat-ready nuclear weapons can only be flown on the authority of the Commander in Chief, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the National Military Command Authority.
All of these transportation regulations were flagrantly violated on August 30.

Handling Violations

Violations of regulations concerning handling of the nuclear weapons in North Dakota are worse. A sophisticated computerized tracking system is used for nuclear weapons. Multiple sign-offs are required to remove the weapons from their storage bunkers.
The AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile was designed to carry nuclear weapons. No non-nuclear warhead is available for this missile. So the only possible error could have been loading nuclear warheads on the missiles instead of practice dummies.
The practice warheads have standard blue and yellow signs declaring "Inert, non-nuclear". The nuclear warheads have at least three distinctive red warning signs. This error is therefore highly improbable, absent tampering with signage.
Nuclear weapons are transported from the storage bunker to the aircraft in a caravan that routinely includes vehicles with machine guns front and rear and guards with M-16s. All steps in the process are done under the watchful eyes of armed military police.
Rules require that at least two people jointly control every step of the process. If one person loses sight of the other, both are forced to the ground face-down and temporarily "placed under arrest" by observant security forces. All progress stops until inspections are made to assure the weapons weren't tampered with.
All nuclear weapons are connected to sophisticated alarm systems to prevent removal or tampering. They could only be removed from the storage bunker by turning the alarm off. And the squad commander clearly would not have authority to turn off the alarm.

The Impossible Mistake

Bluntly, the mistake of loading nuclear weapons on a combat aircraft in combat-ready position is simply not possible to make. Safeguards are far too stringent and far too many people would be involved. Particularly given that the mounting was in violation of policy that's been in place without exception for almost 40 years.
No discipline is expected to be meted out. The New York Times tried to imply the commanding general had been fired. Actually, the squad commander in charge of munitions crews at Minot was "relieved of duty pending an investigation". He has not been removed from his position or

disciplined. The crews involved have been "temporarily decertified pending corrective actions or additional training" but have not been disciplined. No mention has been made of the wing commander.
Note carefully: These actions amount to nothing at all. The wing and squad commanders are still in place and the crews can easily be re-certified.

Successful Confusion

Washington's efforts to confuse the public have been successful. Attention has shifted from the crucial issue.
This news has already become non-news. The August 14 stand-down will momentarily become news, followed by announcements of more stringent restrictions, improved safeguards and additional training. The public always has been and always will be safe.
One of the major issues will be avoided: Someone in an irregular chain of Air Force command authorized loading and transport of nuclear weapons. And that would never have been done without a reason. Given the magnitude of regulatory violations involved, the reason must be extremely important.
The paramount issue will be avoided, if necessary with repetition of the reassurance that the Air Force was in control at all times. The weapons were only missing during the 3.5-hour flight. At Barksdale, the missiles were considered to be unarmed items headed for modernization or the scrap heap, and of no particular importance. They were left unguarded for almost ten hours.
According to one report, almost ten hours were required for airmen at Minot AFB to convince superiors that the nuclear weapons had disappeared. According to information provided to Congress, this time lapsed before airmen at Barksdale "noticed" the weapons were present. News reports will continue to overlook this fact also.
Even here the focus is on time. The number of missiles and warheads issue was overlooked.
Early news reports spoke of five nuclear warheads loaded onto the bomber. Apparently, this information was provided from Barksdale. That number was later updated to six weapons missing from Minot, apparently based on anonymous tips provided to Military Times by people at Minot. This information has also been forgotten.

Conclusion

Six nuclear weapons disappeared from Minot AFB in North Dakota.
Five nuclear weapons were discovered at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana.
Which leads to my chilling conclusion:
Someone, operating under a special chain of command within the United States Air Force, just stole a nuclear weapon.

What next?

The answer has been provided several times, most recently by CIA Director and General Michael Hayden. On September 7, dressed in full military uniform, Hayden told assembled members of the Council of Foreign Relations: "Our analysts assess with high confidence that al-Qaida's central leadership is planning high-impact plots against the U. S. homeland."
"We assess with high confidence that al-Qaida is focusing on targets that would produce mass casualties, dramatic destruction and significant aftershocks." An eye for an eye. Use of nukes will justify use of nukes. A perfect excuse to wage nuclear war against Iran. I suspect Hayden is absolutely correct, except for his mistaken identification of the "central leadership" that is planning detonation of a nuclear weapon on American soil.

Missteps In The Bunker: Damage Control?

Missteps In The Bunker: DAMAGE CONTROL?
By Ted Twietmeyer
Sept. 25, 2007
I cannot express in words how awful a recent Washington Post story about the "lost nuclear weapons" is. This pack of lies can make one's blood boil, and was obviously written by:
A. Authors Warrick and Pincus don't have a remote clue about the actual handling of nuclear weapons
OR
B. The Washington Post article is one big dis-information piece and rates as perhaps the worst piece of propaganda I've ever read in years. I'd like to think for now that Warrick and Pincus aren't part of such a blatant attempt at damage control. In fact, the innumerable inaccuracies are a total insult to any reader with even half a brain still working.
If it wasn't for my respect for the copyright notice of the Washington Post (hard as it may be) it would be prudent reproduce their article in its entirety. If you haven't read this abominable "piece of work yet (and you are not planning to eat today) check it out at the link below.
Be sure to come back and keep reading.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/22/AR200709...
However, I will reproduce some short excerpts under the fair use law from the Warrick and Pincus article for clarity. Keep in mind that there is a STRICT chain of custody for ALL nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons

handling is spelled out in great detail in Air Force regulations, to the credit of the USAF. Every person who order the moving of these weapons, handles them, breaks seals or moves any nuclear these weapon must sign off for tracking purposes. US Airforce security personnel see to that. We are not talking about paintball cartridges or BB gun ammo here. These are NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

Let's begin with the Warrick and Pincus introductory paragraph:

"Just after 9 a.m. on Aug. 29, a group of U.S. airmen entered a sod-covered bunker on North Dakota's Minot Air Force Base with orders to collect a set of unarmed cruise missiles bound for a weapons graveyard. They quickly pulled out a dozen cylinders, all of which appeared identical from a cursory glance, and hauled them along
Bomber Boulevard to a waiting B-52 bomber." [2]

Let's examine this statement: "Weapons graveyard. More nonsense. Obsolete nuclear weapons are recycled, they are not buried somewhere in a field like road kill. The extremely expensive Plutonium "pit" which is about the size of a softball (see below) IS the actual nuclear bomb which is recovered. The pit is surrounded by high
explosive segments. Because of the extreme steady-state heat of the pit, explosive will dry out and become inert. Other parts of the weapon are salvaged, and what little is left over is shredded into small pieces and sold as scrap. It's also noteworthy that nuclear weapons are HIGH maintenance items.

Worth millions of dollars, and more precious than gold. A plutonium pit - the actual nuclear bomb element [4]

Plutonium pits have a hot steady-state temperature of about 400F. Pits from destroyed weapons are then stored in bunkers. It literally takes dozens of railroad cars of extracted uranium to make ONE Plutonium pit. Each is worth several million dollars. Again, all this no big secret it was on the Discovery Channel a few years ago on a documentary showing how weapons are decommissioned.

The Washington Post article goes on to say, "They quickly pulled out a dozen cylinders, all of which appeared identical from a cursory glance" How do the authors know this? They certainly didn't get any information from those involved. "Identical from a cursory glance"?

ALL weapons have serial numbers on them for identification and tracking. Airmen never can just "quickly" pull out a dozen cylinders. You don't move something "quickly" that weighs in around a ton. Especially since it contains HIGH EXPLOSIVE trigger and nuclear material.

Cruise missile being mounted under a bomber (Courtesy USAF website [5]). Can you imagine anyone "quickly moving" something THIS big?

The US government told CNN on or before Sept. 6 2007 that SIX nuclear warheads mounted on cruise missiles were missing, NOT TWELVE. [1]

"The airmen attached the gray missiles to the plane's wings, six on each side. After eyeballing the missiles on the right side, a flight officer signed a manifest that listed a dozen unarmed AGM-129 missiles. The officer did not notice that the six on the left contained nuclear warheads, each with the destructive power of up to
10 Hiroshima bombs."
NUCLEAR weapons were mounted under wings for TRANSPORT? And the officer responsible for these weapons "did not notice the six on the left contained nuclear warheads." WHICH left side? If the pilot is in the cockpit, to his left is port and to his right is starboard. If someone is standing out on the tarmac facing the plane, left and right are reversed. Still the problem remains, there were NOT 12 WEAPONS. The authors may have been told by someone that the B-52 can support up to 12 weapons, so they went with that number. Let's not let facts get in the way of what really happened.
And it just keeps getting worse. The article goes on to say that it would be 36 hours before anyone noticed. UTTER NONSENSE. In the cockpit, weapon lights would be lit indicating the presence of the SIX weapons under the wings. AND the plane would handle quite differently, as the presence of the weapons will change the aerodynamic characteristics of the plane. I was told this by a retired USAF pilot.
The article also rambles on stating the Louisiana airbase "has no idea nuclear warheads were coming." More lies -- a FLIGHT PLAN had to be filed FIRST. Nuclear devices always warrant special handling. To state the destination airbase had no idea nuclear warheads were coming is a bald faced lie. As I've stated in my previous essay, there are safety officers, ordinance officers and everyone involved SIGNED OFF on the weapons. Who could possibly believe the pilot didn't know about the weapons?
There are LEAD SEALS on the containers the weapons are stored in. Cruise missiles are not just "sitting on blocks in storage" like a red-neck junk car without wheels in someone's backyard. They are kept in SEALED CONTAINERS with a crimped and numbered lead seal.
THE FINAL NAIL IN THE STORY'S COFFIN
PROPER RECOGNITION OF A REAL PATRIOT - LT.COL. GUY RAZER (Ret.) FOR HIS HELP
The following UNCLASSIFIED document was recently received from Guy S. Razer, LtCol, USAF (Ret.) which provides detailed information on how nuclear weapons are to be handled. He wrote me shortly after my first essay about this non-accident to inform me my statements were accurate, and he also provided supporting documentation for USAF security procedures for handling nuclear weapons. I have included below

just a few verbatim extracts from the 8 page document which was updated 4 Sept. 2007.
NOTES TO HELP THE READER:
The document extracts below date back to 1991 and are probably based on even earlier versions.
NO-LONE ZONES-- No serviceman is allowed into the restricted areas alone.
TAMPER CONTROL PROGRAM -- Details how lead seals are to be made and documented. Seals detect covert theft of radioactive material (nuclear warheads) from weapons.
Sec. 1.3 Defines the requirements of any personnel who are permitted to handle nuclear weapons. It further states they must be certified to do so.
Sec. 3.3 Details the use of a video camera recording system to document seals.

START OF SELECTED EXTRACTS
"Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs Supplement" (USAF document.)
This Interim Change (IC) 2006-2 provides new/additional guidance regarding the definition and intent of the Air Force Tamper Detection Program, further clarifies the intent for MAJCOMs to develop and distribute sealing procedures and updates general information. A bar (|) indicates a revision from the previous edition.
1. Requirements and Procedures.
1.1. Tamper Control Program. The Two-Person Concept is central to nuclear surety tamper control measures in the Air Force. It is designed to make sure that a lone individual cannot perform an incorrect act or unauthorized procedure on a nuclear weapon, nuclear weapon system, or certified critical component.
1.2. Concept Enforcement. Each organization with a mission or function involving nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems, or certified critical components:
1.2.1. Identifies no-lone zones (where at least two authorized persons must be present during any operation or task).
1.2.1. (AFSPC) Apply Two-Person Concept procedures during training with non-war reserve assets to the extent necessary to maintain proficiency.
1.2.2. Enforces the Two-Person Concept
1.2.2. (AFSPC) Before entering a no-lone zone, brief personnel that the Two-Person Concept applies. Supervisors must ensure that individuals are aware of the location of all no-lone zone boundaries, location of certified critical components within the no-lone zone, emergency

procedures, and methods for reporting violations and hazards. Do not use signs or devices externally that identify a building as a no-lone zone.
1.2.3. Develops procedures to limit entry to authorized persons who meet the requirements of paragraph 1.3.
1.2.3. (AFSPC) After entry into a no-lone zone, the supervisor/team chief of each authorized team controls individual team members within the no-lone zone.
1.2.4. (Added-AFSPC) After initial entry of an authorized Two-Person Concept team into a no-lone zone, a single, authorized individual may enter providing:
1.2.4.1. (Added-AFSPC) The Sole Vouching Authority (SVA) identifies dividuals wishing to gain entry to a no-lone zone, verifies authorization, and validates need for entry into the no-lone zone. Note: SVA is the representative identified as having responsibility for deciding who will enter the no-lone zone. Normally, this is the senior member of the first team entering the area. SVA may transfer between individuals provided the two individuals jointly identify
1.2.5. (Added-AFSPC) An area designated as a no-lone zone may be defined as the interior of a cabinet, a work bay or equipment bay; an entire structure or building, a junction box, a drawer, an area encompassed by an actual boundary established by painted markings, rope, or a fence; and in some instances, the interior of vehicles. Local commanders are authorized to enlarge a no-lone zone. This authority should be used sparingly and only when absolutely required. When used for unattended storage of nuclear weapons or certified critical components the no-lone zone must meet the requirements of AFI 31-101, The Air Force Installation Security Program, and AFI
1.2.5.7. (Added-AFSPC) Any room, computer facility, vault, or similar area where certified critical components are repaired (operationally certified or decertified), manufactured, stored, or processed, is a no-lone zone. For an area in which maintenance is infrequently performed on certified critical components, establish a temporary no-lone zone with signs placed around the work area while components are present.
1.3. Team Requirements. (Refer to paragraph 1.1.6.1 for criteria on foreign nationals.) A Two-Person Concept team consists of at least two individuals who:
1.3.1. Are certified under the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), as specified in AFI 36-2104, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program(formerly AFR 35-99 and AFR 40-925).
1.3.1. (AFSPC) Inspectors or evaluators who meet the requirements of paragraph 1.3. may form a Two-Person Concept team in the performance of their duties.
1.3.2. Know the nuclear surety requirements of the task they perform.

1.3.3. Can promptly detect an incorrect act or unauthorized procedure.
1.3.4. Have successfully completed nuclear surety training according to AFI 91-101.
1.3.5. Are designated to perform the required task.
1.4. (AFSPC) Violations to Report. Report violations of the Two-Person Concept, including emergency response, through the command post to the commander. The commander will ensure violations are investigated promptly. A Two-Person Concept team must ascertain if unauthorized acts were performed, inspect involved certified critical components, verify their status, and reestablish the integrity of the system. Accomplish applicable visual and functional checks for components that have such procedures established.
1.6.4. PRP Interim-Certified Personnel Restrictions. Two interim-certified individuals may not form a Two-Person Concept team. Also, do not allow an interim-certified member to pilot a single-seat aircraft loaded with nuclear weapons.
TAMPER DETECTION PROGRAM
2. Tamper Detection Program. Seals help to verify that no one has tampered with or accidentally activated a certified critical component.
2.1. Sealing Requirements. Certain items must be sealed because either:
2.1.1. Air Force nuclear weapon system safety rules require it, or,
2.1.2. In the case of some certified critical components, seals protect their certification status while in storage or during transportation, as specified in AFI 91-105, Critical Components (formerly AFR 122-17).
2.2. Sealing Methods. Authorized sealing methods include:
2.2.1. Safety Wiring and Lead Seals. In this method, you place a lead seal on a safety wire connected to certain switches, covers, handles, or levers and impress the lead seal with a distinctive mark using a crimping device and controlled die. An unauthorized act breaks or alters the wire connection so that you can detect activation. Use this method only in no-lone zones.
2.2.2. Tamper Detection Indicators (TDI). In this method you place an approved TDI so that it will indicate when someone has activated or had access to the interior of a certified critical component. Once the TDI is installed, evidence of tampering is visible to the naked eye or can be detected through the use of special equipment.
3.3.1. (AFSPC) Where AFSPC directives do not cover a particular local situation, wings will develop local standard publications or checklists to ensure adequate control of certified critical components or nuclear weapons and application of the Tamper Control and Detection Programs.
3.3.2. Develop and distribute procedures for sealing, where appropriate. As a minimum, these procedural directives:
3.3.2.1. State when and by whom seals can be applied and removed.

3.3.2.1. (AFSPC) Units will designate personnel authorized to apply and remove tamper
detection indicators (TDI). TDIs will be applied and removed by a Two-Person Concept team when required by technical orders or directives.
3.3.2.2. Establish controls for the handling, receipt, storage, issue, inventory, and disposal of TDIs (including all residue), controlled dies and self-locking, non-reversible seals. (example: roto-seals)
3.3.2.2. (AFSPC) Develop local controls for handling, receipt, storage, issue, inventory, and disposal of TDIs not covered in technical orders, directives or this supplement.
3.3.2.2.1. (Added-AFSPC) The Aquila Cobra Seal TDI-1 (ACSTDI-1) is used to maintain certification of the Missile Guidance Set (MGS) during shipment. Task-qualified personnel must install, remove, and
verify the ACSTDI-1.
3.3.2.2.2. (Added-AFSPC) The ACSTD-1 system kit requires special handling. The kit which includes special tools, camera, printer, video disks, ACSTDI-1bodies, and fiber optic cables does not require special handling. Maintain the video disk used during the ACSTDI-1 installation process under proper Two-Person Concept control until all information recorded on the disk has been properly verified by the unit receiving the MGS. Maintain the master pictures taken during the installation process under Two-Person Concept control until TDIs on MGS shipping containers are verified by the receiving unit.
3.3.2.2.3. (Added-AFSPC) Prior to shipping a certified MGS to another unit, ensure the receiving unit has a copy of the master pictures taken during the seal installation process.
Transmit the master pictures by facsimile machine or overnight mail. Immediately upon receipt of the master pictures the receiving unit will contact the sending unit via telephone to confirm that the pictures have been
received and are under Two-Person Concept control. The sending unit will verify the caller,s identity by immediate call back. Accomplish this verification procedure prior to shipping the MGS.
3.3.2.2.4. (Added-AFSPC) The sending unit must inspect installed ACSTDI-1s immediately prior to loading the MGS shipping container for shipment. The same inspection is performed upon receipt of the MGS.
3.3.2.2.5. (Added-AFSPC) Dispose of the ACSTDI-1 by destroying the body and discarding it along with the cables.
****
END OF EXTRACT
I challenge anyone who, after reading this documentation, can state that the missing nuclear weapons were accidentally mounted under the wings of a B-52.

Without question the order to mount these weapons UNDER the wings of a B-52 came down FROM THE VERY TOP of the military. And he lives in a white house.
Ted Twietmeyer
www.data4science.net

Langley planes to be grounded Sept. 14

The Air Force has ordered a stand-down for all jet fighters and bombers for Sept. 14.
By Stephanie Heinatz
Go to original.
September 7, 2007
Planes at Langley Air Force Base will be grounded Sept. 14 in response to an incident last week when a B-52 bomber was mistakenly armed with six nuclear warheads and flown for three hours across several states.
The stand-down was ordered by Air Combat Command and includes all jet fighters and bombers in the Air Force. The command, headquartered at Langley, oversees all of the service's fighters and bombers.
Planes in Iraq and Afghanistan and planes participating in air shows this weekend are not affected by the stand-down. While airmen haven't been given specific instructions for the stand-down, they've been ordered to take the non-flying time to review safety procedures and protocol, an Air Combat Command spokesman said.
To mistakenly load nuclear weapons on a bomber, military officials told the Associated Press, safety protocols likely would have been ignored.
On Aug. 30, a B-52 with six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles flew from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., a military official told The Associated Press. The missiles, which are being decommissioned, were mounted onto pylons on the bomber's wings. It is unclear why the nuclear warheads had not been removed beforehand.
The plane's crew, according to news reports, did not know they were carrying nuclear weapons. The weapons are designed with safety features that ensure the warheads don't detonate accidentally or upon impact during a crash.
Arming the weapons requires stringent protocols and authentication codes, according to the AP. The munitions squadron commander was relieved of duty, and crews involved with the load have been temporarily decertified for handling munitions, an official told the AP. Citing Defense Department policy forbidding the release of any information about nuclear

weapons, Pentagon officials have not confirmed that nuclear weapons were involved in the incident.
However, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and President Bush were immediately notified of the incident, a Pentagon spokesman said. Gates has asked to be briefed daily on the Air Force investigation, which is being led by Air Force Maj. Gen. Douglas Raaberg, director of Air and Space Operations for Air Combat Command at Langley.
Raaberg was not available for comment Thursday. His full report is expected to be delivered to Gates as early as next week.
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
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Command Override: How Chinese Military Hackers Took Over a Nuclear Armed B-52

It is the absolute responsibility of everybody in uniform to disobey an order that is either illegal or immoral." -General Peter Pace, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff addressing the National Press Club, Feb 17/06

Command Override: How Chinese Military Hackers Took Over a Nuclear Armed B-52

By William Thomas
September 22, 2007
Go to Original.

[Ed. note: This piece is provided for informational purposes and for the citations & links provided. Check the original or contact the author to seek further verification of the analysis.]

The story sounded like a sequel to "Dr. Strangelove". Leaked by the Pentagon's news service, Military Affairs to quell scuttlebutt racing through the ranks-and perhaps warn the world-a U.S. Air Force B-52 strategic bomber "mistakenly" loaded with six nuclear cruise missiles took off from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota on August 30, 2007 and

flew for more than three hours over at least five states, before landing at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana.

The mistake was so egregious, the National Command Authority comprising President George BU.S.h and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates were quickly informed. The SecDef has since been assured that nuclear weapons “were part of a routine transfer between the two bases… at no time was the public in danger.”

Both statements are false.

In fact, nuclear weapons like these are carefully crated for shipment between bases, and placed inside the bomb bays or cargo compartments of transporting aircraft. In stunning contrast, this reporter has learned from two independent and highly placed sources that the six Advanced Cruise Missiles dangling from the B-52's fatigued and flexible wings were fully armed and ready to fire-except for a single fail/safe switch under the Command Pilot's control.

The quickly blacked out episode has prompted an Air Force investigation. Gates, whose official defense computer was hacked last June, necessitating the shutdown of the entire SecDef network, has ordered daily briefings on the Air Force inquiry. The Minot base commander, who might turn out to be the hero in this frightening affair, was relieved of his command.

DR. STRANGELOVE VISITS BOURBON STREET

As far as anyone knows, no U.S. aircraft has ever been armed with a full wartime loadout of six nuclear weapons. “Nothing like this has ever been reported before and we have been assured for decades that it was impossible,” declared Representative Markey, co-chair of the House Task Force on Nonproliferation. [AP Sept 5/07; Seattle Times Sept 5/07]

Hans Kristensen, an expert on U.S. nuclear forces, says he knows of no other publicly acknowledged case of live nuclear weapons being flown on bombers since the late 1960s. [http://ace.mu.nu]

Director Stanley Kubrick's “Dr. Strangelove Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb” was released in 1964

Each of the six ACMs carried a “dialable” 150-kiloton W80-1 warhead--for a combined total of 60-times the destructive power of the bomb that melted the city and inhabitants of Hiroshima--over the unsuspecting residents of five states. Depending on the route flown, a half-dozen armed nuclear weapons wafted for three-and-a-half hours over North Dakota and either South Dakota or Minnesota, Nebraska or Missouri, Oklahoma or Arkansas, and Louisiana.

It's no secret that Dick Cheney and his presidential surrogate intend to bomb Iran into the Kingdom to Come. [BBC News Aug 29/07]

But New Orleans?

“What does the government have against Louisiana?” asked a blogger named Lobster Martini. [www.democraticunderground.com]

TOUGH LOVE

The “mistake” was supposedly discovered when the B-52 landed at Barskdale, where the plane should have been secured by an armed security detail. Instead, it simply parked on the flight line, where ground crew noticed the words “nuclear armed” stenciled on the sides of the missiles. [ ]

Three officers confirmed the warheads were, in Bush's argot, “nucular.” But the mission could have ended in a “broken arrow” nuclear calamity if the bomber had crashed, or inadvertently dropped its ordnance. Munitions, and even entire engines-such as the No. 1 turbine that fell off an American Airlines DC 10 after taking off from Chicago's O'Hare airport in May, 1979, killing two people on the ground and all 271 people onboard-occasionally drop from underwing pylons in flight. [Chicago Tribune May 26-30/79; National Transportation Safety Board Aircraft Accident Report NSTB-AAR-79-17]

A few other examples:

-- A B-36 ferrying a nuclear weapon from Biggs Air Force Base, Texas to Kirtland accidentally drops a bomb in the New Mexico desert. [ww.nuclearfiles.org]

-- A fighter pilot accidentally dropped a BDU-33 dummy bomb into a house, narrowly missing a family of three. [www.f-117a.com]

-- A 500-pound bomb fell from an FA-18 plane during a routine training exercise and exploded on the edge of a U.S. base 100 miles north of Sarajevo. [AP July 17/02]

-- A National Guard F-16 fighter jet on a nighttime training mission strafed an elementary school in New Jersey with 25 rounds of depleted uranium ammunition. [AP Nov 4/04]

-- Another U.S. Air Force practice bomb accidentally on the Yorkshire countryside in England. [BBC Jan 12/04]

-- Electromagnetic interference from military transmitters may have caused an F-16 jet to accidentally drop a 500 pound bomb on rural West Georgia. [Montreal Gazette May 12/89]

> A crash, mid-air explosion or structural breakup-not uncommon occurrences with heavily-laden B-52s-could have ignited the high explosives used to implode the warheads. The ultimate dirty bomber's fantasy could have seen plutonium--the deadliest substance ever conjured by humans-raining down over what would become a statewide "national sacrifice zone", off-limits to all life-forms for more than 4 billion years.
>
> Barksdale AFB is no stranger to nuclear accidents. On July 6, 1959, a C-124 "Flying Boxcar" crashed on takeoff, completely destroying the aircraft and the nuclear weapon it was carrying. [www.cdi.org]

[See: "Broken Arrows"]

PROTOCOLS

The Air Combat Command has ordered a command-wide stand down for September 14, 2007 to "review procedures." Though they actually responded flawlessly to apparently authentic orders, the highly trained specialists who carried out the nuclear loadout have been temporarily "decertified" from handling nukes.

Representative Ike Skelton, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, called the mishandling of arms capable of destroying cities "deeply disturbing. There is no more serious issue than the security and proper handling of nuclear weapons." [AP Sept 5/07]

The crewdogs who flew their assigned mission without mishap have been ordered not to mention that all pilots are required to perform a "walk around" inspection of their airplanes and calculate elaborate "weight-and-balance" graphs before attempting to aviate. Failure to notice or be informed of the much heavier nuclear casings on the missiles they were carrying would have jeopardized flight safety.

According to a well-informed and extremely thorough U.S. military source I call "Hank" (with whom I have broken major stories over the past 15 years), someone "must have adjusted the bomber's balance. It had to have been done."

In addition to knowing what is externally attached to their airplane, the amount of paperwork, signatures, and discrete passwords involved in releasing a nuclear weapon from its storage bunker and loading it onto an airframe are more formidable than flak.

And there were six of them.

PICKUP AND DELIVERY

The coded message to upload and launch the B-52 from Minot with six live nuclear weapons carried the signature of the "football" containing the

day's nuclear launch codes that is carried close to the president at all times by a specially detailed aide. After checking and counter-checking their coded orders, as few as a dozen people in uniform were actually involved in the subsequent secret nuclear mission.

According to Hank, at least three high-ranking officers were escorted into Minot AFB's nuclear arms bunker after passing through multiple doors secured by pass codes, whose complete sequences were supplied each officer, who only knew part of each code. One hiccup, a fumbled code sequence, or “the wrong wrench” would have cancelled the loadout instantly.

SAFETY FIRST

Because the base had stood down for Labor Day, the timing was ideal for security. In his standing orders for August 30, 2007, 5th Bomb Wing commander Colonel Bruce Emig encouraged his troops to “Enjoy a safe Labor Day weekend.

“Warbirds, It's hard to believe that Labor Day weekend is already here!” the colonel wrote. “Though cooler temperatures are right around the corner, the weather forecasters tell me that we should have a warm, summer-like weekend. Since Air Combat Command and Air Force Space Command have declared Friday a Family Day, many of you should be able to enjoy a nice, 4-day break as we transition from summer to fall. I wish all of you a relaxing and enjoyable time off, and urge you all once again to please keep safety in mind in all you do!” [www.libertypost.org]

Under a bomber's nuclear umbrella in a discrete corner of the sprawling airbase, air, ground and ordnance crews did not converse with each other. Or anyone else. Everyone involved knew better than to ask questions that could abruptly end their careers by inadvertently tipping people who did not need to know.

LOADOUT

Within hours, an airplane with a wingspan longer than the Wright Brothers' first flight was safely loaded with avgas, sandwiches, and six nuclear weapons. Uploaded to the bomber using an accordion cradle on each missile trolley, each Advanced Cruise Missile was fueled once it was secured to a hard point under the aircraft's wings. Because the ACMs were not inside a bomb bay, where they could be armed in flight, each underslung missile had to be fully armed before takeoff. “Wing walker” is not a B-52 job description.

The plates connecting the firing circuits of each warhead to the cockpit were then activated, and the safeties were pulled from each clearly marked “nuclear weapon”-rendering it “live”. For the Explosive Ordnance Disposal detail who performed the loadout, there could be no doubt they were activating six nuclear weapons.

Alarms on the flight line should have sounded as soon as they sniffed hot ions leaking from the pulled pile rods in six slowly fissioning warheads. But the alarms remain silenced. That order, Hank insisted, could only have come under the properly coded signature of the National Command Authority-Commander-in-Chief G.W. Bush or Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates.

The ensuing takeoff was an event branded on the central nervous system of every creature in auditory range as eight jet engines at maximum takeoff thrust levitated six missiles, up to 46,000 gallons of fuel, and an airplane the length of a 150-foot ship into a blue yonder that had just become much wilder. Everyone within miles knew that a B-52 had come into Minot and taken off again. But only God and the devil knew where it was going. [www.boeing.com]

And they weren't saying.

WHO DUNNIT?

In the silence left by this momentous departure, if there were questions, nobody voiced them. Perhaps there were a few quietly delivered high-fives instead. Despite the high stress that runs counter to every human instinct, everyone involved had carried out their assigned duties with complete attention to the details required to launch a half-dozen live nuclear weapons “safely”. The professionally conducted operation was carried off in complete secrecy, without a hitch, only after the loadout and launch order had been digitally confirmed as coming from the NCA.

There was only one problem regarding the originators of those orders, Hank emailed me:

“IT WAS NOT US.”

FAULTY (COMPUTER) TOWERS

Let us quickly review. My earlier exclusive on my former website, willthomas.net, disclosed how in October 2006, North Korea's leaders asked China to take out Japan's shiny new recon satellite before it could be tasked by American officers to monitor Pyongyang's first atomic test. Blowing up someone's satellite is an act of war. But overriding its “Made In China” microchips with a remote command from the ground could never be proven. Even if no solar flares were recorded at the time.

This first Chinese demo got the Pentagon's attention. After all, their stated goal of “Full Spectrum Dominance” over Earth's land, seas, airspace and electromagnetic spectrum depends on America's successful weaponization of space. But as the Joint Chiefs are only now discovering, many of the supposedly secure chips in America's civilian infrastructure-as well as all military communications, surveillance and weapons systems-have been “Wal-Marted” by U.S. corporations to low-bid Chinese suppliers-who rigged them for failure or takeover by “command override” in the event of war.

[See: “Faulty Microchips Threaten U.S. Attack On Iran”]

SEE DICK RUN

The second demonstration of China's newfound capabilities to manipulate microchips came in late February 2007, when Dick Cheney's 757, flying home from Australia where the Vice President had not been well received by the locals, was forced to divert to Singapore.

In a story intriguingly tagged, “U.S. Denies Cheney Forced To Land,” Agence France-Presse reported that the White House admitted the Vice-President's “specially secured” Boeing 757 had “suffered electrical problems” before landing in Singapore. But Cheney spinner Lea Anne McBride insisted, “This was the preplanned, scheduled refueling stop. We were not diverted. The vice president did not get off the plane during his refueling stop.” [AFP Feb 26/07]

Wrong again.

According to U.S. military personnel present on the tarmac at Paya Lebar Air Base-who according to Hank said were “trying to yak with the locals: 'Can you get us this part? Do you have a Radio Shack?'”-a small Chinese delegation met with Cheney outside his electronically-challenged aircraft. Wandering in and out of the brief conversation, Hank's sources described the brief encounter, which occurred shortly after 1400 hours Singapore time.

Disembarking Air Force One, Cheney said something like, “Gosh, we got this kind of interesting problem…”

“No, you don't understand sir,” a Chinese official interrupted. “This is how we brought you here. And this is why.”

Cheney's visitors itemized the separately wired galley stoves, reading lights, in-flight video, and power outlets onboard the Vice President's aircraft that had all conked out in flight. They knew this, they said, because the electronic signals that had disabled the microchips controlling these various devices had been directed by their government. In an impressive feat, the Chinese military had located and selectively targeted a stealthy aircraft painted with radar-absorbent materials flying at nearly 500 knots at 35,000 feet without a public itinerary.

According to Hank's boots-on-the-tarmac sources, the mostly one-way conversation in Singapore concerned “Gulf of Tonkin possibilities.”

“They reached out and touched someone,” Hank related. “They had a message they wanted to get across: 'You've got ships out there in the Gulf. If this thing cooks off, all bets are off because some of the things that are put out there, we are really now wanting people to talk about.'” The Chinese were referring to their control of most of the microchips on this planet.

A very thoughtful Dick Cheney departed two hours later.

OPENING THE GATES

The next Chinese digital demo came last June. In what came to be called “the most successful cyber attack ever mounted on the U.S. defence department,” Chinese military hacked into a Pentagon computer network serving the defense secretary's personal office.

Like their American counterparts, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) regularly probes U.S. military networks. But American officials said these latest cyber attack caused grave concern when China demonstrated it “could disrupt U.S. defenses systems at critical times.”

“The PLA has demonstrated the ability to conduct attacks that disable our system... and the ability in a conflict situation to re-enter and disrupt on a very large scale,” revealed a former official, adding that the PLA has also penetrated the networks of U.S. arms corporations and war-launching think-tanks. [Financial Times Sept 3/07]

A Chinese official named Jiang repeated his government's denial that it had penetrated other government and military computer networks. But British and German newspapers cited intelligence and other officials saying that government and military networks in Germany, the United States and Britain had been broken into by Chinese army hackers this summer.

According to the Associated Press: “China's military has openly discussed using cyber attacks as a means of harrying or defeating a more powerful conventional military. In a 1999 paper on unconventional strategies titled 'Unlimited Warfare' two top Chinese military figures wrote that a hacker could have more power than a nuclear bomb.”

In a report this year, security software maker Symantec Corp. listed China as having the second most malicious computer activity in the world-after the United States. [AP Sept 6/07]

Speaking as a soldier, Hank commented, “The June hack showed an enormous hole in our ability to protect and communicate our information.

LOST IN SPACE

The next hack came almost immediately, when Russian computers controlling the International Space Station's orientation and supplies of oxygen and water inexplicably failed while the station's three crewmembers were hosting seven visiting shuttle astronauts.

Among the station's network of six Russian computers, only two remained functioning. A system-wide re-boot usually resolved smaller hitches, But this time, the system was unable to re-boot.

"A failure of this type has not occurred before," the BBC reported. [BBC June 14/07]

"This is serious," stated James Oberg, a retired rocket scientist turned author and consultant. "These computers run their life support, so if they can't be restored, the space station could become uninhabitable." Oberg

added, "Statistically, this is not random. There is some new environmental factor that must identified and isolated, and neither step is trivial." [TechNewsWorld June 14/07]

Russian flight controllers and onboard engineers traced the problem to "odd readings" in electrical power cables feeding the Russian computers through a corroded junction box labeled BOK 3. [Space.com July 16/07]

The gremlins returned to the Russian machines on February 5, when another ISS computer system crashed in the Zvezda Service Module that routes data between orientation sensors and four positioning gyroscopes. The space station's solar power stopped supplying power, and communications were cut with Earth.

Though power and comms were restored three hours later, New Scientist reports, "The cause of the computer crash remains a mystery. NASA has so far not identified the cause of the crash." [New Scientist Feb 5/02]

But Hank was on it. "They had limited oxygen, a limited time frame," he observed. The astronauts onboard the space station didn't know if the next computer malfunction "would open an airlock." But like an airliner in flight, the station should have smoothly shifted over to backup systems. It didn't.

"The word 'redundancy' never got into the story," Hank pointed out. Instead, all three backup circuit boards wired into three isolated circuits, "had to blow out in the same way at the exact same time. The fault that occurred in the first board, the second board, and the third board all had to be the same damn thing at the same damn time."

"Impossible," he declared. Especially, since each of the simultaneously faulty microchips had been "stress tested to hell and back. Except for internal stressors."

Except for "Made In China" microchip mischief.

While it is not yet confirmed that the February 5 microchip malfunction was related to the June 14 space station hack, according to Hank's sources, on that earlier date the Chinese pulled the equivalent of Cheney's Singapore diversion--in space. "Nobody got busted for it," he adds. "You always hear about the company at fault."

Not this time.

AC WE SEE

While White House fundamentalists remained mesmerized by the firepower ostensibly under their command, Beijing kept trying to send a very different message. Their next installment came in early September 2007, when U.S. Air Force officers passed through multiple levels of security and entered the inner computer sanctum of America's Air and Space Command deep under Cheyenne Mountain. This digital repository stores regularly updates archives needed to execute "clean reinstalls" in case air force computer systems crash or are otherwise compromised.

Entering the quietly humming room, the air force officers were shocked to see monitors aglow with light. The displays were supposed to be off. As they watched in shock and awe, randomly typed letters scrolled across a screen. The words were gibberish. But the message was heart-stoppingly clear: "We Can Play With Your Toys!"

The sender "left breadcrumbs," Hank related. The deliberately attached ISP (Internet Service Provider) pointed to China.

This was bad enough. But what really freaked out the officers was the realization that none of these "stand alone" machines was online. None of them contained a modem!

The only way to access these machines, Hank revealed, is to "use the sneaker net to walk up to it and tap on the keyboard. And yet they were interacting, and they were doing it in real time. They fussed with our stuff. These guys were able to go into what was a stand alone system and take control of it."

How did the PLA hack supposedly secure air force computers lacking network modems? Just like as select power companies can now pipe the Internet to home computers through electrical power lines, the Chinese were able to play on SAC's supposedly secure computers through the AC power cables connecting them to the national power... "grid".

But how did they break supposedly "unbreakable" military encryption? And how were they able to transmit signals to override specific chips buried under a mountain of granite halfway around the globe? According to Hank, the International Space Station was not in line-of-sight with China when it's onboard computers and back-up systems simultaneously went down.

HIT MAN

When it comes to dialing up a bomber to drop nuclear weapons on another country, "It's kind of like hiring a hit man," Hank explained. You meet him in the parking lot with the assignment, a weapon, and cash. Later, you confirm that you haven't changed your mind. Then the mission proceeds, and either the target or the hit man is taken out.

In the case of the mission out of Minot, the First Phase began with an initiation order authorizing weapons release to arm a B-52 specially flown in for this operation. Proper codes and paperwork provided the Pilot in Command with an initial heading to fly, and initial waypoints or nav points to punch into the plane's GPS. No destination was provided. The pilots were just supposed to get in and drive.

They did.

Once the B-52 was airborne, it flew into an electronic black hole. No electromagnetic emissions came from the bomber. There were no radio calls to home base asking, "Are you guys sure you really want to do this?" Even more startling, no coded IFF squawks identified the BUFF

(Big Ugly Fat Fucker) as friendly to prowling post-9/11 fighters. And no transponder beeps identified the airplane and its mission.
This is not the normal procedure for transporting weapons, or flying a B-52 through heavily-trafficked air corridors over the Continental United States. Every aircraft flying at high altitudes over CONUS, (or through Controlled Airspace around airports at lower attitudes) must transmit their identity on an assigned transponder frequency.
Commercial planes squawk in their own dialect. "When you're talking a government vehicle, like a C-130 [military transport], that's another level up," Hank noted. "It's a different kind of squawk. ATC knows how to treat that kind of traffic differently. A B-52 is another level up. Controllers don't see that every day. A C-5 [flying down from Colorado to dust a hurricane, for example]-they really don't see that every day."
The transponder code of the B-52 out of Minot would have prioritized it to civilian Air Traffic Control, and they would have cleared a corridor for its exclusive track-much like a presidential motorcade.
If this Bad Boy had been transferring six advanced nuclear cruise missiles to Barksdale, as official spin insisted, its transponder would have squawked: "Hey, guess what? We've got nukes onboard! Make sure no one runs into us. And if this signal stops scramble recovery people wearing proper attire."
Or code to that effect.
But this did not happen.
"The Situation Room in the White House was not stood up, but they still have people there," Hank continued. "One of their jobs is to track nuclear weapons. Somebody in that head shed should have seen a transponder code matched up with nuclear weapons loaded onto that aircraft. That should have been something that went up on the board. They would have known that a B-52 was getting a full loadout, and that all procedures had been followed. And someone else would have said, 'Mmm, six nukes. We'll keep an eye on it."
And given an order for radar operators to push a button to highlight that particular blip.
Instead, the blacked-out BUFF flew on.

TARGET IRAN

High in the stratosphere, where the nitrous oxide exhaust from eight fuel-hungry turbines attacked this planet's shredding ozone layer, boosting global warming another notch toward a catastrophic methane meltdown, wings never designed to carry heavy ordnance flexed up and down like a bird in flight. The crew must have considered the long roster of crashed Stratofortress with ?broken arrows? onboard. Not for a second could they forget that the six live nuclear weapons strapped to their wings were as close to detonation as a gremlin's wet dream.

Or the fail-safe switch under the Plane Commander's gloves.
An hour or two out of Minot, a bell chimed in the cockpit and a secure printer spat out a coded paper message. Even if they betrayed no emotion, the pilots must have felt a chill. Because the mission's next critical Fail-Safe had been passed. "We've thought about it, and the mission is still a go," the message essentially read. If these new orders had not been received, or had been issued incorrectly, the plane would have immediately turned back to the nearest base capable of handling its special needs.
But their orders were in order. Positively authenticated by both pilots as coming from the NCA, the new message received onboard the bomber issued the radio frequencies, call signs and rendezvous coordinates for "hitting" one of three aerial refueling planes constantly orbiting over the Gulf of Mexico. Their new "Go Code" also identified their target region. After topping off their tanks, they were to take up a heading for another Gulf, half a world away.

BLIND MAN'S BUFF

Wouldn't the base commander, or the other officers involved in sending live nuclear weapons toward Iran have second thoughts about a strike that could trigger an even bigger political-military chain reaction?
Not necessarily, Hank explained. Military leaders usually favor intimidation in place of bloodshed. If the Iranians could be dissuaded from acquiring a nuclear deterrent of their own, or decide to stop supplying their Shiite brothers next door with sophisticated shaped-charge rockets capable of penetrating the depleted uranium hides of M-1 Abrams tanks-terrific! Everyone involved in the mission must have hoped that in this high-stakes brinksmanship, when Iranian sensors picked up the radioactive signature of an inbound American nuclear bomber strike, the mullahs in Teheran would burn their Korans and turn to Jesus.
On the other hand, how do you say "pissed off" in Persian? The mullahs might panic and start pushing buttons of their own. Especially when the Israeli Air Force was notified of the strike, and launched "supporting" fighter-bombers of their own.
In any case, it was out of the hands of the base commander and his immediate superiors. Since any one of these key staff officers could conceivably be kidnapped or impersonated during a nuclear strike, none had the authority to issue a recall order. Even if someone in the chain of command issued an RTB (Return To Base), SAC bomber crews en route to the final IP coordinates to commence their attack are trained to ignore all such entreaties.
In fact, a frantic "Come home for lunch," or "Call your wife" command would confirm for the crew that something really was amiss, and they were at war.

In this way, a series of rote military assumptions can make an ash out of you and me.

WHAT, ME WORRY?

Meanwhile, the man under whose digitally coded authority this strike was being carried out, remained completely unaware that six nuclear cruise missiles with his name on them were headed toward Iran.

Phase Three would have issued coded authorization to take out their assigned targets. One target confirmed by two highly placed, independent sources was a nuclear power plant hard against the mountains of Iran. "But the bomber would still have five missiles left. And it would not leave the area empty," Hank insisted. "If they go loaded for bear, they're not going to leave with a rabbit."

After all, he added, a pre-BDA [Bomb Damage Assessment] would have been done before launching the bomber "to determine how many it would take. And they needed six?"

Despite all the Hollywood hype, cruise missiles are notoriously inaccurate. Just ask the folks ducking strays in Kuwait or Iran. Still, a cruise missile striking within 30 miles would have taken out that Iranian power plant. But if the nuclear-tipped ACM had detonated over its pile? "Bad. Bad. Very bad," as Hank would say. Because the resulting electromagnetic pulses from such a synergistic chain reaction would have--among other things--fried every unhardened Chinese microchip aboard every American ship, plane and vehicle in the Persian Gulf.

"You don't have to sink the CAG, just turn it off," Hank said, referring to the formidable--yet completely microchip dependent--Carrier Air Group steaming off the coast of Iran. "Once they realized that these ships were just bobbing around out there," the bad guys would have "launched 10,000 rowboats" from surrounding shorelines to go play pirates.

Was this why several Chinese Aegis destroyers were steaming in from the east about 250 nautical miles from the Straits of Hormuz? Was this why two or three Chinese submarines had been deployed to the area of the transiting destroyers the week before?

Or were the two Chinese anti-aircraft destroyers part of an elaborate fail-safe in case the demonstration glitched and the bomber could not be recalled? Even if their anti-aircraft missiles could not reach the distant plane (easily tracked through its rigged Chinese chips), specific signals sent from the ship could have turned the plane around. Or its fuel off.

What were the Chinese thinking?

CHINESE CHECKERS

Ever since Katrina, and the subsequent standing wave put up off the south coast of Africa by HAARP to deflect hurricanes from the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, Beijing has felt under siege as earthquakes and wild, shipping-interrupting storms continue to be conducted "all the way to

China" by the powerful Gakona, Alaskan transmitter. [See "Where Have All The Hurricanes Gone"-upcoming on willthomasonline.net]
Three times, the Chinese have attempted to override HAARP. And failed. Elaborate demonstrations of their electronic warfare capabilities--including fizzing circuits in space, and a face-to-face with the U.S. Vice-President in Singapore--had not persuaded American leaders to A: Refrain from hoisting a false flag over a Persian Gulf of Tonkin, and B: Turn HAARP off.
Surely, Beijing must have reasoned, ordering a United State Air Force strategic bomber loaded out with six armed nuclear weapons to fly over the United States and then on towards Iran would conclusively demonstrate who was now in charge.
"This op would not have 'Made In China' stamped all over it," Hank pointed out. "Instead, American bombs, American bombers and American systems were used." No matter how the mission had proceeded, if Washington had been forced to tell the world, "It wasn't us. We lost control of our bomber carrying six atomic warheads"--how would that have looked to a global audience already angry over America's misuse of its military might?
Whatever Beijing's intentions, Hank was not the only person in the U.S. military to have his head rearranged by this latest Chinese demonstration. "They might have wanted to go all the way. Of they might have wanted to put pieces in play and see how far they could go," he surmised. "Maybe the Chinese started, and stopped it."
Either way, the unauthorized Minot mission has bluntly shown the White House and the Pentagon: "If you start something, we can stop it. You no longer know how much control you have over your own weapons systems because we can play with them at will. No matter where you are, no matter what you're doing, if you're using our chips you are vulnerable. And you can't know if our Trojan chips are in your systems unless you tear apart every circuits in every surveillance, communications, weapons system, pipelines, telecom and power grid in your entire military and civilian inventory and look. And then dismantle every network they are connected to."
"And one more thing," Beijing inferred, "If you take offense and pop off a missile, remember, we might make it do a loop-de-loop and come right back down on its originating silo."
Hank and others in America's command hierarchy remain alarmed and puzzled-which makes them even more uneasy. Would China's leadership have precipitated a cloud of radioactive fallout downwind over their own population? Emphatically, yes. The country's generals have long counted an expendable population and land mass as key factors in "winning" a nuclear war.

Best case scenario, this recent flight of fancy was a warning for Washington to chill the bomb Iran rhetoric, and dial down HAARP.
"Maybe the Chinese got it right and they were just messin' with us," Hank mused. "Or they got it wrong, and something very bad almost happened. But why only one plane? Why stop there? It's a limited use of a system that is now exposed."
But what can we do about it?
And what a message it sent!
[See "Cyber War"]

RECALL

Phase Three of the mission would have sent coded target grid coordinates and time(s) of weapon(s) release, as well as updates on weather over the area, enemy defense status and friendly escorts. Those orders never came.
Instead, Phase Four was initiated. When the cockpit teleprinter spat out paper tape again, it read, in so many words: "Forget the whole thing. Abort the mission. Turn back." The only people capable of issuing a nuclear strike recall order would be the President, the Secretary of Defense, a specific designate of the SecDef authorized by special code. Or a Chinese military hacker.
As Hank notes, "The plane had to be diverted to a base that could handle nuclear weapons." That would be Barksdale. But...
"Live hot nukes would have tripped alarms on the tarmac when it touched down. Either they were nonfunctional on both ends [Minot and Barksdale], which is scary beyond belief considering what we're talking about." Or the Joint Chiefs or the NCA could have ordered the radiation sensors silenced to keep the mission-and the hijacked mission-under wraps. Or the Chinese could have turned them off. If the system is digital, Beijing probably controls it.
Bottom line: if the incoming bomber had crashed approach, no one responding would have known they were dealing with a quiver-full of "broken arrows".

BARKSDALE

Thought the missiles were never launched, they still remain in play. As Hank worried, "Six nukes are now forward deployed to the air force base that handles Middle East ops."
A former counter-terrorism expert with the CIA and the State Department shares his concern. Larry Johnson does not buy the official story that six nuclear weapons were "mistakenly" flown over the USA-not after a retired B-52 pilot reminded him. "The only time you put such weapons on a plane is when they are on alert, or if the crew has been tasked to move the weapons to a specific site." Besides running nuclear war exercises

like the Global Guardian drill it ran on the morning of 9/11, Barksdale AFB deploys "heavies" to the Middle East.
Like Hank, Johnson wants to know, "Why would we want to preposition nuclear weapons at a base conducting Middle East operations?" His pilot pal believes that an insider leaker tried to send up a bright red flag. Johnson asks, "Did someone at Barksdale try to indirectly warn the American people that the Bush Administration is staging nukes for Iran?" [www.antiwar.com]
But Hank points out another problem. Cruise missiles-which are essentially autonomous, unpiloted drones-have special needs. Since six cruise missiles showing up at Barksdale were an oddity, can they be adequately stored and maintained there? The Gulf Coast is "a very different environment" than Nebraska, Hank emphasizes. How long is Barksdale going to hold onto them? In the hurricane season?
"Are we going to see some of them floating out on the tide?" Hank wants to know. Americans need a big confirm that these weapons have been sent back north to a better home.

An Interview Verifying "Command Override"

VERIFICATION
By William Thomas
Unable as a professional journalist to go to press without verification, I turned for confirmation to a second highly placed source within the U.S. power structure. The following questions were placed by an intermediary well-known to me, to a source who does not know Hank, but like him, cannot be identified:
Was the target Iran?
Yes.
Was it a nuclear power plant in Iran?
Yes.
Was the power plant the Bushehr nuclear power plant on the coast?
No. Let me rephrase that. A nuclear power plant, but not that one.
Were Bush and Cheney involved?
No.
Was the flight crew involved?
The crew did not know what was going on.
[Taping started as the interview resumed.]
Was it the Americans?
No.

Was it the Russians?
No.
Was it the Japanese?
Yes.
Was it Japanese technology?
Yes.
Do the Japanese know what it was being used for?
No.
Was it related to the June incident?
Yes. It is the same technology.
Was the order placed like a Trojan Horse?
It's tied into something else. It's not a simple answer.
Was it like a microchip virus?
Kind of. It's in that category. But not exactly it. It's a technology that's not widely known.
Was it electromagnetic or a microchip?
A technology not widely understood. You already asked me that.
What technology did Japan have that China did not have?
It is a highly secretive thing that only China knows about and U.S. does not know about.
Is it technology that they had found in Japan and immigrated into technology they have?
China has gone as far as they could figure out to go. And there were some pieces that the Japanese had. Like if you were doing some kind of experiment and not being able to complete it.
Is the technology the Japanese had not normally used?
Yes.
Is it military technology?
It can be applied to military. It can be applied to other things.
Was this done to prevent war or to be used to make war happen?
Can't answer that question that way. The technology can be applied to anything that you want to apply it to. The Chinese purchased the technology from the Japanese and they told the Japanese that 'you don't need to know what we're doing with it.'
Was it purchased from a private company?
Yes. It's not from the government. It's from an individual group, a group of people who developed the technology.
Would it be possible to get the name of the Japanese group?
No.
What would the term for such a Japanese group be?
It's a group of techies, like woodbangers, young people playing around seeing what they could do with the technology. It's not a group with an agenda developing the technology, saying 'Now we're going to do this.'

They were playing around, seeing what they could do with the technology and somebody found out that they had been able to do this and said, 'we'll pay you.' The ones with the agenda were the Chinese.
What was the purpose of the operation?
The operation was made to look like America is the aggressor.
What was the stated destination and ETA of the official flight plan?
The original flight plan was changed while they were in flight. When the pilot got on the plane, he thought he was going one place. And then he was told to change course.
Is it true that the base commander could not issue a recall order?
Right. The military officer did not have that authority. He had to get it from someplace else.
Was the plane diverted back?
Yes. It got called back for some reason past Barksdale because somebody in the government realized something was not normal. The Chinese are showing they can break the code, and 'You're not as big a power as you think you are.'
Did the recall originate in the U.S. or China?
U.S.
Who issued the recall order?
Someone in the military. This person issued the recall, but was under the orders of someone else.
Was this a demonstration of China's capabilities, or an actual attack on Iran?
It was China saying 'Wake up for America. You haven't seen nothin' yet.'
Did they intend to go all the way?
No. It wasn't set. It was a demonstration of power.
What happened when the plane landed at Barksdale? Was the crew detained?
No.
Was the crew debriefed?
No. They did not know what was going on.
After this incident, how can the U.S. military command be certain their orders are genuine?
They can't.

Airforce Personnel Comment on Flying Nukes

By Anonymous
Sept. 23, 2007

Below are posts culled from a bulletin board on the Military Times website regarding the Minot-Barksdale cruise missile incident I admit to cherry-picking the comments, but they're representative of the majority opinion on the board, which seems to be populated primarily by ex-military and, in this thread, ex-AF. Most of the acronyms are indecipherable to me.
Here is the link to the comment thread.

Re: B-52 mistakenly flies with nukes aboard (Repost of the Military Times piece.)

#9 09-05-2007, 03:47 PM / Retired B-52 Crew Chief

UNBELIEVABLE. I'm not sure where to begin. I'm outraged and embarrassed! Back in 1979 we had to sign for nuclear weapons verifying serial numbers, the security folks posted two man guards at the aircraft, the cops enforced two man maintenance crews access to aircraft, the 781s are annotated, maintenance job control was informed, the wing command post was informed, weapons were moved in armed convoy, etc. How were the weapons removed from storage? Who was guarding the weapons military troopers or contractors? How were they transported to the aircraft? How were the aircraft forms updated? How was the chain of custody broken? Did the flight crew and munitions maintenance OICs verify weapons status? What the hell happened here? This is dereliction of duty, Wing CC, DCM, OMS/CC Munitions Sq/CC, Security Sq Commander and a lot of other folks should be going to jail, today !!!!!!!!!!! Maybe we have too many fighter pilots as generals. Maybe we need to split Air Combat Command back to the cold war days of SAC and TAC.

#10 09-05-2007, 03:50 PM / Unregistered

Being a former cruise missile troop, I do not see how this could have happened. If the "missile shop" failed to download the heads before taking them to the flightline, the crew loading them on the plane has a checklist asking them to "verify no warheads installed", as do the pilots.... hmmmmm, maybe they thought they were dummy heads. That's the only way I can see that possibly happening. Wonder what happened to the guy signing off that inventory?

#146 09-06-2007, 03:23 PM / Unregistered

The transfer of nukes to another command isn't the same as the transfer of missile airframes. If they got just an airframe transfer order, then they should have known that the airframes they were transferring had nuclear warheads loaded and started asking questions. If they somehow got orders to transfer the airframes with the warheads, once they got to the a/c, the pilot in command should have run up a red flag, because he left the mission briefing thinking he was ferrying airframes and is suddenly being asked to sign for nukes.

The only way this happens is either procedures were so lax that it was considered inconsequential whether or not a nuke was installed in a

missile, or somehow the knowledge that nukes were installed just magically disappeared from view at some point in the process (which also speaks to lax procedures, but in the context of execution rather than overall policy). Either way, the mechanisms for such a thing happening is hard for me to imagine -- the level of accountability I was familiar with in handling special weapons and knowledge was so high that any breakdown in execution would bring the whole process to a grinding halt and get several different people's commanding officers on the phone with each other to figure out what to do. I just find it amazing that the Air Force could actually let weapons out of storage and onto an aircraft without knowing it had done so.

#192 09-07-2007, 11:56 AM / Carl

I don't believe a word of this.

Nuclear bombs don't get on B52s by mistake, and certainly not nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, and most definitely not for a flight across the US. Hell, nuclear weapons don't even get out of their bunkers without everyone, and I mean everyone, in the chain of command knowing about it. Anyone who says this was an accident is clearly involved in disinformation (a more elegant term for "lying"). The very idea that nobody at Barksdale knew this plane with nukes aboard was coming in is laughable in the extreme. This from a military that compulsively counts 9mm rounds?

#203 09-07-2007, 07:27 PM / Unregistered

I was a PACAF IG inspector in the 1970-1975 time frame. When we performed CIs, it was a very tough inspection covering all aspects of nuclear munitions. It didn't take much to take the keys, lock up the facility, and bring in the training guys to re certify the MMS handling of nukes. Is that still the procedure during this day and age? - I realize that AF manning has dropped significantly over the years and our people need to do more with less. As an example of how tough it was, I remember one time when a maintenance man changed a time phased part (rubber grommet) with a non T.O. part - as we discussed the incident around the table, the boss let them off the hook. He noticed my dissatisfaction and I told him I did not approve of his decision - that weapon had a specific mission and follow up missions would be compromised if that weapon did not explode.

Luckily, the next day, they violated the two man concept and we failured the unit. The Boss told me that he did not sleep the night because of our conversation - we had stringent rules, this is a serious incident and almost impossible to believe that it could have happened. This is bad news for the best Air Force in the world and a blot on many people's records. The only good that comes out of this situation is that it reminds Mr. Ahmadinejad to the fact that we are a very powerful country and will

not take his actions lightly. He is now aware that one B-52, B-2, or whatever carries a lot of throwweight and "Mister, don't mess with us".

#205 09-08-2007, 09:49 AM / Bueller

I was a navigator/radar nav of B-52s at Minot for 5 years, and there is only one person responsible for this incident, the radar navigator on the crew that flew the missiles down there. If he did his preflight correctly he would have known what he had on board, and that there was a problem. I suspect he blew it off because they were told they didn't have warheads in the missiles, and even before I left the jet in 2000 the units had become so focused on conventional warfare that the nuke mission was being neglected. Just goes to show that you NEVER take what the paperwork says or what anybody else tells you as being the truth. You ALWAYS preflight your weapons, even when you have weapons troops or some Colonel standing there tell you that you don't need to do it, because it is your job and your responsibility alone. The radar nav should have known that, and did his job. He didn't, and now they have a big mess on their hands. I suspect the radar nav will find himself up in front of an FEB explaining his mistake, and he should lose his wings. Had I been in his position I would have raised hell when I saw what I had, if for no other reason than to be a pain in the ass to the leadership for letting the weapons get to the plane in that state in the first place. That is the best part of being a radar nav on the B-52, you have a license to bitch!

#206 09-08-2007, 11:38 AM / Unregistered

I agree, the radar nav was the last line of defense when it came to making sure that the nukes stayed on the ground and the one in the best position to question what was going on. Shameful

But lets take a look at the other party's at fault

1) The munition Sq control room for not ensuring that the warheads were removed per schedule. Shameful

2) The missile/bomb shop for not removing the warheads per the schedule. Shameful

3) The munitions transport/handling shop for not questioning why they were driving a SAFED Nuke out the front gate of the storage area without security. Shameful

4) The security police for not being able to identify a Nuke as it goes out there front gate and not questioning it. Shameful

5) The load crew for not questioning why they were loading SAFED Weapons onboard an aircraft without security. Shameful.

6) and last the radar nav for not questioning his payload.

#207 09-08-2007, 12:26 PM / Unregistered

This little fairy tale doesn't hold up to the slightest scrutiny. In order to believe it you have to be willing to slander a whole parade of people who, by definition, are the very best at what they do. I'm not willing to do that.

I've never flown with a crew of morons. Ordnance people, ground crews, and the maintenance chief with the aircraft log book are not a bunch of shambling zombies. The entire chain of custody for those special weapons did not include people prone to making the biggest screw up in the history of the Air Force.
Many posters here have pointed out that the people in this story are all top-flight professionals. What if that is true? What if every single one of them did exactly what they are trained, and required, to do? What if everything went exactly according to plan, until somebody smelled a rat and called the press? As Sherlock Holmes would say, “When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.”
The undeniable fact is that 6 special weapons were moved from Minot to Barksdale, or, 6 special weapons were moved from secure storage to a staging area for the ME. Let us not ignore the obvious- the administration is openly ramping up a conflict with Iran. They have been reported as having floated the idea of using nukes on deeply buried targets. They have already performed acts that caused an enormous, global, public outcry. I suspect that the officers who leaked this story feared that they were witness to the start of the greatest war crime in history, feared that their own chain of command was complicit in it, and did the only thing they could think of to do to stop it. That would make this story exactly what it sounds like- a coverup based on the first panicked lie the administration could think of.
And on and on and on... In the interests of equal time, here's a dissenting point of view:
#17 09-05-2007, 04:24 PM / Unregistered
The three officers who leaked the story to the press should be punished just as harshly as those responsible for this snafu. This was a classified incident and it should've stayed that way. There was no serious danger to the public, nor any real need-to-know on the public's part. It is clearly a one-time incident and probably resulted from a combination of factors. The Air Force, regardless of the publicity, will conduct a thorough investigation and implement certain procedures to ensure this never happens again. So all of this publicity is irrelevant and accomplishes nothing other than giving our enemies and peaceniks verbal ammunition to use against us politically.
Goddamned peaceniks. Always sticking their noses where they don't belong, trying to undermine this great country. Why do they hate America?

B-52 carrying nukes mistakenly overflies U.S.

B-52 carrying nukes mistakenly overflies U.S.
By PAULINE JELINEK / The Associated Press / 9-5-07
Go to original.
WASHINGTON — A B-52 bomber was mistakenly armed with six nuclear warheads and flown for more than three hours across several states last week, prompting an Air Force investigation and the firing of one commander, Pentagon officials said today.
The incident was so serious that President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates were quickly informed and Gates has asked for daily briefings on the Air Force probe, said Defense Department press secretary Geoff Morrell. He said, "At no time was the public in danger."
Rep. Ike Skelton, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, called the mishandling of the weapons "deeply disturbing" and said the committee would press the military for details. Rep. Edward J. Markey, a senior member of the Homeland Security committee, said it was "absolutely inexcusable."
"Nothing like this has ever been reported before and we have been assured for decades that it was impossible," said Markey, D-Mass., co-chair of the House task force on nonproliferation.
The plane was carrying Advanced Cruise Missiles from Minot Air Force Base, N.D, to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., on Aug. 30, said the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of a Defense Department policy not to confirm information on nuclear weapons.
The missiles, which are being decommissioned, were mounted onto pylons on the bomber's wings and it is unclear why the warheads had not been removed beforehand.
The Air Combat Command has ordered a command-wide stand down on Sept. 14 to review procedures, officials said. They said there was minimal risk to crews and the public because of safety features designed into the munitions.